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ABSTRACT
Oluwatimi, Oyindamol D. Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2018. Applications of
Context-Aware Systems in Enterprise Environments. Major Professor: Elisa Bertino.
In bring-your-own-device (BYOD) and corporate-owned, personally enabled
(COPE) scenarios, employees’ devices store both enterprise and personal data, and
have the ability to remotely access a secure enterprise network. While mobile devices
enable users to access such resources in a pervasive manner, it also increases the
risk of breaches for sensitive enterprise data as users may access the resources under
insecure circumstances. That is, access authorizations may depend on the context in
which the resources are accessed. In both scenarios, it is vital that the security of
accessible enterprise content is preserved.
In this work, we explore the use of contextual information to infuence access
control decisions within context-aware systems to ensure the security of sensitive enterprise data. We propose several context-aware systems that rely on a system of
sensors in order to automatically adapt access to resources based on the security of
users’ contexts. We investigate various types of mobile devices with varying embedded sensors, and leverage these technologies to extract contextual information from
the environment. As a direct consequence, the technologies utilized determine the
types of contextual access control policies that the context-aware systems are able to
support and enforce. Specifcally, the work proposes the use of devices pervaded in
enterprise environments such as smartphones or WiFi access points to authenticate
user positional information within indoor environments as well as user identities.

1

1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices are becoming a mandatory aspect of the daily lives of users. These
devices have powerful functionality granting users various abilities through installing
and executing applications which are abilities similar to desktop computing platforms.
With such abilities, users are, for example, able to compose documents, set calendar
reminders, and complete other daily tasks. Unlike their desktop counterparts, these
devices’ form factors allow mobility with respect to embedded sensors and network
connectivity. With the capacity to have permanent Internet connection via cellular or
WiFi infrastructures, mobile devices enable pervasive access. Users are able to access
emails, access remote networks, and manage and download private, confdential, or
secret data (e.g., banking data or medical data) in any context.
The capabilities of such mobile devices, as well as their increasing a˙ordability and
mobility, have enabled enterprises to leverage them in the workplace. This creates
two main scenarios: bring-your-own device (BYOD) and corporate-owned, personally
enabled (COPE) device. In the BYOD scenario, employees use their own personal
mobile device also for work purposes. Conversely, in the COPE scenario, it is the enterprise that provides devices to its employees. In both scenarios, that we collectively
refer to as enterprise-enabled device (EED) scenario, the same device is used for personal and business purposes. Such a dual use makes it possible for enterprises to rely
on a mobile Information Technology (IT) infrastructure. Such an infrastructure allows
employees to remotely access enterprise content that otherwise would not be accessible outside of the enterprise setting. Despite interesting opportunities provided by
mobile devices, access to such data and resources, however, may be contingent upon
the context in which they are accessed. Accessing enterprise content, whether locally
or remotely, in insecure contexts increases the risk of sensitive information leakage. A
user situated in a public café may succumb to a shoulder surfng attack by a random
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passerby when the user is viewing sensitive medical data via his/her device. If accessing remote content via the device, sensitive information such as banking data could
be captured by an adversary sniÿng the café’s public WiFi network. For the sake of
ensuring the security of personal and enterprise content, contextual factors that exist
within the physical and computing realms must be considered while evaluating access
control requests.
Consider an enterprise organization in which an employee, carrying her smartphone on her person, is attending a confdential meeting. It may be required that
the employee cannot access the device’s microphone to prevent, whether it is unintentional or malicious, audio recording of the confdential meeting’s conversation. In
the same scenario, the employee is handed a draft of a patent document that is to
remain in that room, and therefore, the document should not be visually recorded
using the smartphone’s camera. The capabilities of the employee and her smartphone
in the above scenario are contingent upon, although not immediately obvious, various
environmental factors that exist in the physical and computing realms such as location and mobile applications that have the potential of executing, respectively. As a
consequence, policies and systems that do not incorporate contextual parameters or
restrictions are not suitable for the described circumstances, as well as enterprise environments in general in which mobile devices are integrated into IT infrastructures.
Below we present defnitions of a context and a context-aware (CAS) system that will
be used throughout this work.
Context. Various authors have attempted to construct a defnition of the term
context, but some defnitions are not fexible or scalable enough to be applicable to
a breath of scenarios old and new. In this work, we adopt the following generalized
defnition of context [1]: "any information that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity. An entity is a person, place, or object that is considered relevant to
the interaction between a user and an application, including the user and application
themselves".

3
Context-Aware System. Although Dey [1] also defnes context-awareness for
systems, it does not refect the sentient characteristic of an aware entity. As such,
we adopt the following defnition of context-awareness [2]: "context-aware systems are
able to adapt their operations to the current context without explicit user intervention".
In general, CASs operate in pervasive computing environments in which certain
applications require contextual information (CI) in order to provide data, services,
or resources. The objective of such systems is to maximize the usability of data
and services by incorporating environmental factors such that access is automatically
granted without explicit user intervention. There are many unique problems, previously and newly formulated, that CASs can be applied to [3–7], some of which we
now briefy describe. For example, although it is understandable why the progression
in elevator technology has become stagnant as a result of the simplicity of the task,
recent system designers have envisioned that future elevators will be context-aware.
Using a system of sensors, elevators will be able to automatically detect when users
are heading towards or waiting to get into an elevator [8]. Movie information services such as Fandango inform users of the next available movie showings in theatres
that are within the users’ vicinity. In assisted living, some patients are the only resident of their household. It is vital that caretakers are immediately and remotely
alerted of abnormal behavior in patients once detected [9]. While the previous example applications defne context within spatial and temporal parameters, context
can be quite vague and is application dependent. Context can comprise of information related to altitude, temperature, humidity, ambient light, radio, motion, audio,
etc. In this dissertation, we investigate the feasibility of using various technologies
to support context-aware access control, including radio-, motion-, and audio-based
technologies.
The proliferation and technological advancement of wireless networking and sensor technologies – such as smartphones or WiFi access points – enable portable mobile
devices to be used in CASs. In recent years, smartphones’ continually advancing operating systems (OS) and hardware capabilities have allowed capabilities not present
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in their desktop counterparts. For example, many smartphone manufacturers have
leveraged these devices’ mobile form factor by integrating embedded sensors and
network connectivity peripherals including, but not limited to, Bluetooth, GPS, accelerometer, and near-feld-communication. In addition, various static and dynamic
CI can be extracted from mobile devices such as hardware and software confgurations
which also can be utilized by CASs to adapt the systems’ operations automatically
to the processed information. Some other systems utilize information extracted from
wireless devices pervaded in enterprise environments such as WiFi access points to
not only localize a user, but to also detect the presence of other users. Specifcally,
proximity is yet another contextual parameter that can be leveraged to support automated, CASs.
In summary, context can be divided into three di˙erent categories [10]:
• User Context: it refers to any information related to the user, including user
dynamic information (user current and historical location, user current and
historical activity, user current emotion, relationships or contact with colleagues
or friends and so on) and user static information ( user personal information,
user habit, user preference, and so on).
• Physical Context: it contains environmental physical information (lighting,
noise, temperature, humidity level, traÿc conditions and so on) and device
physical information (device battery, memory, the size and type of screen, terminal’s OS, input and output method, nearby resources such as printers, and
so on).
• Network Context: network capacity, connectivity, costs of computing and communication, bandwidth and so on.
The work proposed here explores the use of various types of mobile devices to
extract and process primarily user contextual information in CASs and apply such information to access control and data isolation techniques in order to secure enterprise
content. Access control is a security technique to regulate the sharing of resources
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among entities in a computing environment. In terms of access control, contextaware systems aim to secure access to sensitive enterprise resources by adapting their
access authorizations to the current context. For example, following the presented
enterprise scenario, an access control policy for the employee’s smartphone device
would state in some manner or form "from 1PM to 2PM, device microphone is inaccessible". Such policy would prevent the device from recording the conversation
during the confdential meeting. Containerization is another security technique, but
it ensures the separation of enterprise content from all other non-enterprise related
content on an end-user’s mobile device (e.g., smartphone or laptop). With respect
to containerization, CASs aim to automatically deploy, manage, and update secure
containers that is dependent on CI that enterprises deem pertinent to the security
of the containers and their content. For example, again following the same scenario,
a policy associated with the management of containers would state in some manner
that "a secure container that does not include a camera application must be deployed
to the device when the employee is at the meeting room location". Thus, completely
eliminating the possibility of visually documenting confdential information via the
employee’s device.

1.1

Dissertation Statement
It is possible to apply context-aware systems, supported by various types of mo-

bile devices, to enterprise environments to secure enterprise content from (benign or
malicious) entities whether external or internal to the enterprise organization.
Specifcally, the work focuses on systems that utilize access control and containerization techniques on mobile devices in EED scenarios. We aim to answer three main
questions:
1. how do we capture contextual information?
2. how do we incorporate contextual constraints into access control policies?
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3. how do we enforce contextual access control policies?
We address these questions in several approaches throughout this work, which we
briefy highlight in the next section. Each approach utilizes di˙erent techniques or
technologies to extract various CI from the environment and applies them to access
control or data isolation techniques. Further high-level details of each approach is
provided below.

1.2

Context-Aware Access Control Systems
In what follows, we briefy introduce various security threats that enterprises may

potential encounter in EED scenarios, and subsequently propose context-aware access
control systems to address those threats.

1.2.1

Location-Based Access Control Systems for Mobile Devices

Mobile Android applications often have access to sensitive data and resources on
the user’s device. Misuse of this data by malicious applications may result in privacy
breaches and sensitive data leakage. The problem arises from the fact that Android
users do not have control over the application capabilities once the applications have
been granted the requested privileges upon installation. In many cases, however,
whether an application is granted a privilege depends on the specifc user context.
The need for confgurable device policies based on context extends from high profle employees to regular smartphone users. For example, government employers, such
as in national labs [11], restrict their employees from bringing any camera-enabled
device to the workplace, including smartphones, even though employees might need
to have their devices with them at all times as their devices may contain data and
services they might need at any time. With context-based device access control policies, employees may be allowed to use smartphones as they can disable all applications
from using the camera and any device resources and privileges that employers restrict
while at work, while the user’s device can retain all its original privileges outside the
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work area. Context-based policies are also a necessity for politicians and law enforcement agents who would need to disable camera, microphone, and location services
from their devices during confdential meetings while retaining these resources back in
non-confdential locations. With context-based policies, users can specify when and
where their applications can access their device data and resources, which reduces
the hackers’ chances of stealing such sensitive data since end-users do not have control of the actions taken or exercised capabilities by possibly malicious applications
especially in context-sensitive circumstances.
Previous work on security for mobile operating systems focuses on restricting
applications from accessing sensitive data and resources, but mostly lacks eÿcient
techniques for enforcing those restrictions according to fne-grained contexts that differentiate between closely located subareas [12]. Moreover, most of this work has focused on developing policy systems that do not restrict privileges per application and
are only e˙ective system-wide [13]. Also, existing policy systems do not cover all the
possible ways in which applications can access user data and device resources. Finally,
existing location-based positioning systems are not accurate enough to di˙erentiate
between nearby locations without extra hardware or location devices [12, 14, 15]. In
most cases, such systems assume the context as given without providing or evaluating
context detection methods for mobile devices [12, 16].
End-users need a context-based access control mechanism by which privileges can
be dynamically granted or revoked to applications, on a per-application basis, based
on the specifc context of the user. We propose such an access control mechanism,
which we refer to as Context-Based Access Control (CBAC). Our implementation
of context di˙erentiates between closely located sub-areas within the same location.
We have modifed the Android operating system so that context-based access control
policies can be specifed by end-users and enforced by our system.
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1.2.2

Securing Remote Enterprise Content via Proximity-Based Access
Control

Enterprise organizations have adopted context-aware systems that leverage proximity -based access control (PrBAC) to mitigate threats of information leakage. That
is, access control decisions are not solely based on the requesting user’s location, but
also on the location of other users in the physical space. Consider an enterprise organization in which an employee is allowed to access a confdential fnancial document,
but only if the access is executed within the supervisor’s oÿce. An example of a
PrBAC policy would be to require the presence of the supervisor, in the supervisor’s
oÿce, for the employee to be able to view the confdential document.
In a previous work [17], we introduced a secure, automated PrBAC architecture
and prototype system that we referred to as the Context-Aware System to Secure
Enterprise Content (CASSEC). While our system was agnostic with respect to the
technological choices for detecting physical proximity, we had provided a simple implementation of the complete CASSEC architecture. We utilized Bluetooth and WiFi
devices, which are widely used in enterprise environments, to address the occupancy
detection problem [18] and support two practical proximity-based scenarios often encountered in enterprise settings: Separation of Duty and Absence of Other Users.
The frst scenario is achieved by using Bluetooth MAC addresses of nearby occupants as authentication tokens. The second scenario exploits the interference of WiFi
received signal strength when an occupant crosses the line of sight. Regardless of
the scenario, information about the occupancy of a particular location is periodically
extracted to support continuous authentication. The proposed access control system
allows end-users to automatically access enterprise content stored in a remote server,
and to the best of our knowledge, our approach is the frst to incorporate WiFi signal
interference caused by occupants as part of a PrBAC system.
In this dissertation, we also consider the security implications of an enterprise’s
employees relying on CASSEC’s position-based services to access remote enterprise
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content via endpoint devices. In general, the sensors of a context-aware system extract
contextual information from the environment and relay that information to higherlevel processes of the system so to infuence the system’s control decisions. However,
an adversary can maliciously infuence such controls indirectly by manipulating the
environment in which the sensors are monitoring, thereby granting privileges the
adversary would otherwise not normally have. To address such context monitoring
issues, we extend CASSEC by incorporating sentience-like constructs, which enable
the emulation of "confdence", into our PrBAC model to grant the system the ability to
make more inferable decisions based on the degree of reliability of extracted contextual
information. In CASSEC 2.0, we evaluate our confdence constructs by implementing
two new authentication mechanisms. Co-proximity authentication employs our timebased challenge-response protocol, which leverages Bluetooth Low Energy beacons
as its underlying occupancy detection technology. Biometric authentication relies on
the accelerometer and fngerprint sensors to measure behavioral and physiological
user features to prevent unauthorized users from using an authorized user’s device.
We provide a feasibility study demonstrating how confdence constructs can improve
the decision engine of context-aware access control systems.

1.3

Context-Aware Containerization Systems
EED scenarios enable employees to utilize their smartphone mobile device for

both personal and enterprise purposes, thereby allowing sensitive enterprise content
to be stored and accessed on end-users’ devices anywhere and anytime. However,
security is an important, and the most signifcant, barrier to wide adoption of such
dual-use scenarios. In 2016, conducted research found that the top two security concerns of cybersecurity practitioners, such as enterprise IT admins, were data leakage
(72%) and unauthorized access to enterprise resources (56%) [19]. In fact, nearly
one out of fve organizations (21%) experienced a security breach via EED vectors.
IT admins attempt to mitigate such threats by employing Enterprise Mobility Man-
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agement (EMM) systems which administer secure containers (e.g., work persona) to
end-users’ devices [20], but enterprises continue to su˙er due to EMM systems lack
of or ine˙ective access control and monitoring solutions.
We identify a few shortcomings of contemporary EMM systems. First, EMM systems do not consider the context in which personas are employed. EMM systems,
such as Samsung KNOX [20], do not provide enterprises a means to specify or enforce
contextual constraints to control access to or infuence the behavior of personas. Second, modern EMM systems assume that each end-user uses her device for only one
enterprise. We argue that EMM systems need to support multi-enterprise environments, as end-users may interface with a variety of frst/third-parties with potentially
conficting contextual access control policies. To limit risks of unauthorized access,
it is imperative that organizations employ secure means of contextual authentication
and authorization to protect enterprise content after it is downloaded to end-users’
devices.
To address these shortcomings, we present our position-based, Multi-EnterpRise
Containerization (MERC) architecture for EED security. The MERC architecture
leverages positional data to grant context-aware capabilities to container-based systems. We grant enterprises the ability of defning location- and proximity-based
conditions that must be met in order for users to securely access enterprise container
content. First, we provide a scalable location-based scheme that allows multiple enterprise context-aware systems to securely coexist and activate policies and personas
on an end-user’s device. Second, the MERC incorporates proximity-based constraints
to modify a persona’s behavior. We evaluate our prototype using preexisting infrastructures, and our experimental results show that MERC is an e˙ective and practical
EED security solution for context-based containerization.
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1.4

Document Structure
The rest of this document discusses the above topics in further detail. Chapter

2 presents basic concepts and surveys the state-of-the-art in mobile operating systems, positioned-based systems, and access control systems that lay the foundation
of this work. The frst approach in Chapter 3 addresses the issue of localizing the
user using client-side technology and adapting applications’ access to client-side content depending on the user’s location and time of access. The second approach in
Chapter 4 addresses the problem of localizing a user as well as detecting the proximity of other users without solely relying on end-users’ devices to determine positional
information, and then utilizing such information in access control requests to remote
enterprise content. The third approach in Chapter 5 addresses the issue of applying proximity-based constraints to the management of end-user devices via mobile
containerization techniques and technologies when end-users may be employed by or
consult for multiple enterprises. Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation with questions
and insights directed at enterprises so that enterprises could implement or employ
appropriately solutions for their particular EED scenarios.
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2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we present basic concepts and survey the state-of-the-art in mobile
operating systems, positioned-based systems, and access control systems in order to
understand the work.

2.1

Android
Android is a Linux-based, mobile phone platform designed with a multi-layered

security infrastructure [21]. Loaded on top of the Linux kernel are the System Libraries, Android Runtime, and Application Framework software layers (Figure 2.1).
Each application, which is assigned a unique user ID (UID), is given a dedicated part
of the fle system for its own data, and executes in a separate Dalvik Virtual Machine,
thus creating an application sandbox. Along with Linux’s discretionary access control
mechanism, Android includes a fne-grained permission system that determines the
set of device resources an application has access to. An application’s permissions,
which can be extracted from its AndroidManifest.xml fle, are also associated with
its UID. At the time of an application installation, users have to either grant all the
requested permissions to proceed with the installation of the APK, or cancel the installation completely. As of Oreo (API 26), there are currently over 150 application
developer permissions.
An Intent is an Android messaging facility to support inter-component communication. A component (i.e., Android activity, service, content provider, or broadcast
receiver) sends an Intent message to the OS, which basically specifes the intent of
starting, accessing, or requesting information from a particular component, including
ones from another application.
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Fig. 2.1. Android software stack.

2.2

Position-based Services
There is a variety of technologies that address the localization problem, that is,

to determine and retrieve a user’s location. Generally, each positioning system (i.e.,
PBS) has at least two separate hardware components, a transmitter and a receiver
to send and receive signals, respectively [22]. The receiver analyzes one of three
characteristics of the received signal which are: angle-of-arrival (AoA), received-signal
strength (RSS), and time of arrival (ToA).
PBSs have the ability to detect the current position of user devices, and such
services are important in variety of settings including access control enforcement
in EED scenarios [17]. PBSs vary with respect to many parameters, such as the
position technologies on which they are based, security, privacy, a˙ordability, resource
requirements (e.g., memory or power consumption), and precision level of positional
data, and therefore have their inherent advantages and disadvantages. For example,
geofencing PBSs are able to place a user within a predefned area such as with the use
of GPS, which is the most widely used positioning tool that uses the propagation time
of signals (i.e., ToA) from satellites to compute the position of a receiver anywhere on
Earth. Microlocation PBSs can locate a user with high accuracy such as with the use
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of Ultra Wide-Band radios to provide an accuracy as high as 10 cm by calculating AoA
and ToA [23]. Other positioning techniques based on di˙erent technologies include
Infrared (IR), Radio Frequency (RF), Radio Frequency Identifcation (RFID) [24],
magnetic feld [25], ultrasound [26], Bluetooth [27], and WiFi [7, 9, 28–30].
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) can also be used to retrieve a user’s relative location
in an energy eÿcient manner, and it has been employed by beaconing services [23].
By utilizing widely-used BLE-based beacon protocols (e.g., Apple’s iBeacon, Google’s
Eddystone, and AltBeacon [23]), a beacon region or the proximity of other BLEenabled beacon devices (e.g., smartphones) can be detected. Detection is achieved by
periodically broadcasting beacons that are picked up by BLE-enabled devices. Each
beacon protocol has a di˙erent beacon construction, but we utilize Google’s Eddystone implementation as it is open source and incorporates features that we leverage
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The Eddystone UID is 16 bytes long and consists of
two values: Namespace (10 bytes) and Instance (6 bytes). The Namespace value
is a UUID (Universally Unique Identifer) that identifes a top-level beacon region.
The Instance value identifes sub-beacon regions and can be constructed using any
scheme. For example, semantically, a beacon construction could represent the auditorium within building 10 (i.e., Instance) at NekSec’s campus (i.e., Namespace).
Google’s beacon also provides two measurements. The distance measurement is an
indicator of the proximity of one device to another which is determined based on the
RSS value. The ranging measurement is an intuitive, user-friendly indicator of the
distance between two devices which falls into one of the following ranges: Immediate (very close), Near (at a distance of 1-3m), Far (greater than 3m), or Unknown
(the distance cannot be accurately determined). We also investigate other distancebounding techniques. In particular, we investigate techniques that measure the time
elapsed, i.e., the round trip time (RTT), during the exchange of packets between the
transmitter and receiver. In Chapter 5, we implemented a distance-bounding system using BLE beacons as our underlying technology, which were programmed using
Android’s android.bluetooth.le APIs [31].
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2.3

Context-Based Access Control Models

2.3.1

Overview

The role-based access control (RBAC) model is mainly used in enterprise settings
to facilitate administration of access control polices [32]. In such settings, users are
assigned di˙erent roles whereby each role is granted predefned access privileges to
enterprise resources. Various access control models and systems have been proposed
that use RBAC as a foundational paradigm, and some augment the model so that
privileges associated with a role can only be exercised if contextual parameters are
adhered to. In this section, we provide an overview of role-based access control models
that incorporate CI into the decision-making process.
The most common extension is the inclusion of spatial constraints. GEO-RBAC is
a spatially-aware RBAC model that defnes the concept of spatial roles which allow an
authorized user to assume a role (i.e., role enabling) and exercise its associated privileges (i.e., role activation) only if the user is at or within a designated location specifed
by physical coordinates [33]. LoT-RBAC and STARBAC are other augmented RBAC
models that incorporates spatio-temporal constraints for role enabling and role activation [34, 35]. Unlike the previously mentioned models, the authors in [36–38] did
not focus simply on spatial or temporal constraints, but rather designing an access
control framework that is fexible enough to allow a variety of contextual parameters.
Such models however are not implemented and therefore no enforcement mechanism
has been developed to support these models.
For the purpose of applying those models to real implementations, Sandhu et al.
proposed the notion of PEI (policy, enforcement, implementation) models that defne
a usable structure for creating an implementation of enforcement mechanisms [39].
Gupta et al. proposed a context profling framework based on the surrounding environment captured by the mobile device sensors to estimate the familiarity of a
place [16]. They used such context to create context proflers that are used to confgure access control policies on mobile devices.
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Proximity-based Access Control (PBAC) [40] is an access control model developed
specifcally for Smart-Emergency Environments that takes into account the user’s
proximity to a resource (e.g., a computer). PBAC was implemented using ultrawide band RFID which calculated AoA and ToA to support automated access access
control. Although the system did not require user intervention, active tags (worn
by users) and mounted receivers had to be deployed to determine the tags position.
Prox-RBAC, which extends GEO-RBAC, is a formal authorization model based on
a notion of proximity [41]. That is, access control decisions are not solely based on
the requesting user’s location, but also on the location of other users in the physical
space. Prox-RBAC incorporates elements of the U CONABC usage control model
[42]. Prox-RBAC was implemented using near-feld communication (NFC) allowing
a NFC phone to transmit signals to a NFC reader to lock and unlock a door, and
although it provides high-integrity proof of location, it requires user intervention.
Prox-RBAC has been further extended to incorporate a large variety of proximity
constraints in addition to the spatial ones, namely attribute-based, social, cyber,
and temporal proximity constraints [43]. Many systems, including Prox-RBAC and
PBAC, inherently assume that every individual within a monitored space is trusted.
Systems that are solely based on location tracking devices worn or held by users can be
easily circumvented through collusion. For example, assume sensitive documents are
stored within a restricted oÿce that should only be accessible by a high-level employee
such as a corporate CEO. The CEO will unlock the door with his/her tracking device
(e.g., NFC), but a low-level employee can easily follow immediately behind prior to the
door locking. By not initiating contact between the transmitter and the receiver, the
system would be tricked into believing that no unauthorized personnel is occupying
the restricted oÿce. In another insecure scenario, an employee, assuming he/she was
given a tracking device, can simply remove the device (e.g., active tag) so as to not
be tracked. Neither Prox-RBAC or PBAC addressed a major security problem of a
user obtaining an authorized user’s phone, whether by theft or voluntary provision.
Consequently, individuals may be able to circumvent the access control system via
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collusion, allowing one individual to impersonate another individual by exchanging
tracking devices. In addition, costs for deployment and management of these systems,
and others used in similar architectures, remain signifcant and limit the widespread
adoption of these systems.

2.3.2

Context-based Application Restrictions for Android

Limiting mobile applications’ capabilities on the Android platform is not novel.
Approaches have been proposed to support the restriction of device content access,
but not in the context of EED scenarios [44]. Apex [45], AppFence [46], TISSA [47],
MockDroid [48], and YAASE [49] have developed modifcations to the Android OS
in order to limit data leakage and restrict application permissions. Our work complements these techniques by adding more user controls and device restrictions (such
as intent management) and ties these confgurations to context-based policies that
dynamically apply device restrictions. Our work also complements research e˙orts in
protecting user and application data applied at the middleware and kernel layers of
the Android OS, such as FlaskDroid [50], Moses [51], Saint [52], and TrustDroid [53].

2.4

Containerization

2.4.1

Overview

To support the dual use of mobile devices in EED scenarios, various mobile device
containerization techniques were developed to secure accessible enterprise content as
well as the privacy of employees [20]. In a broad sense, containerization primarily
aims to secure a portion of a device’s resources (e.g., application, storage, or network
access) from other applications and systems running on the same device. When
applied to EED scenarios, containerization isolates within the same device personal
privacy-sensitive applications from enterprise and business applications.
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In order to administer/manage secure containers to/on end-users’ devices, enterprises use Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM) systems [20]. Existing EMM
systems operate at either the application or platform level. The level at which these
systems operate determines the types of containerization technologies they are able
to leverage to isolate content. Application-level EMM systems create an applicationlevel container supported by a non-native application-layer (EMM) framework (Figure 2.2(a)) that allow an application, or a set of trusted applications, to isolate itself
and its data from other untrusted applications. Platform-level EMM systems, supported by a native EMM framework (Figure 2.2(b)), create multiple environments
referred to as "personas" to isolate content so that trusted applications do not execute
in a persona in which untrusted applications also reside. Independently of whether
the container is implemented at the application or platform level, enterprises are able
to confgure policies for the container that modify the behavior of the applications
(e.g., accessing data and system resources).

(a) Application-level Container.

(b) Platform-level Container.

Fig. 2.2. The interactions between two containerized applications and
an untrusted application that exists outside of the secure area. The
gray and red arrows represent permitted and non-permitted communication channels, respectfully.
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2.4.2

Containerization on Android

There are several existing EMM-like systems that utilize multi-partition techniques to isolate private and corporate content. Contrary to our work, most fail to
consider the context in which they are employed. Gupta et al [54] created a custom
Android OS that supports dual-mode personas. In enterprise mode, the system could
enforce policies that disable a subset of device communication peripherals, force the
device to only communicate via an enterprise VPN, and ensure an encrypted external storage is utilized. TrustDroid proposed the use of domains and their isolation
by monitoring and limiting data exchanged via IPC (Inter-Process Communication),
fles, databases, and socket connections.
IdentiDroid [6] is an application level privacy-enhancing tool based on Android
that addresses the shortcomings of network anonymizers (e.g., Tor and Hotspot
Shield). IdentiDroid uses confguration profles which are analogous to personas that
relocate application data when a profle is de/activated. Unlike other platform-level
systems, IdentiDroid also contain application-level containerization through the utilization of several device content protection techniques. DroidARM [55] builds upon
the work in IdentiDroid, but implemented on top of Android Lollipop. In this way,
DroidARM is able to use native multi-user containerization to isolate applications and
data as well as support EMM-based management features. Samsung KNOX 2.0 [20],
the system AFW actually adopted its persona-based approach from, incorporates signifcantly more hardware and platform security than any other platform-level EMM
system, thus providing stronger guarantees of preventing root attacks.
Cellrox [20] uses a lightweight virtualization technology called ThinVisor. ThinVisor resides in the OS and allows multiple instances of the Android OS, which Cellrox
calls Virtual Mobile Instances (VMIs), using the same kernel. Cellrox’s VMIs can be
made portable allowing a VMI to be decoupled from the device and placed in another
device without needing to reconfgure the VMI. None of the aforementioned solutions
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support the activation of a container via location-based constraints or the restriction
of the container’s content via proximity-based constraints.
Several other solutions have been proposed that rely on the data tagging and
information-fow tracking capabilities of TaintDroid [56]. In the work by Kodeswaran
et al. [57], applications are classifed as enterprise-related via parameters such as
market source or developer signature. In addition, the data that is generated or
processed by these applications are consequently tainted as enterprise. However, the
proposed system does not incorporate contextual constraints. The work by Feth et
al. [58] proposes a data-driven usage control architecture in which data is tainted by an
enterprise-provided tag. The system supports context-aware policies by monitoring
various device sensors such as location, WiFi, accelerometer, battery, Bluetooth, etc.
Moses [51] isolates sensitive content from di˙erent personas by tainting data at the
OS level with the name of the persona the data is associated with. Moses supports
passive persona activation via GPS tracking. However, Moses, as well as the work
proposed by Feth et al. [58], is not suitable for indoor environments as a result of
GPS signal attenuation caused by construction materials. Furthermore, all of these
solutions require signifcant modifcations to the Android OS.
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3. A LOCATION-BASED ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM
FOR MOBILE DEVICES
Mobile application developers leverage the computational and communication-based
resources on mobile devices in order to incorporate new or enhanced services to their
applications. However, the majority of these resources can collect sensitive data and
may expose users to security and privacy risks if applications use them inappropriately
and without the user’s knowledge [56]. The threat arises when a device application
acts maliciously and uses device resources to spy on the user or leak the user’s personal
data without the user’s consent [59–61].
In this chapter, we propose a context-based access control (CBAC) mechanism for
Android systems that allows smartphone users to set confguration policies over their
applications’ usage of device resources and services at di˙erent contexts. Through
the CBAC mechanism, users can, for example, set restricted privileges for device
applications when using the device at work, and device applications may re-gain their
original privileges when the device is used at home. This change in device privileges
is automatically applied as soon as the user device matches a pre-defned context of
a user-defned policy. The user can also specify a default set of policies to be applied
when the user is located in a non-previously defned location.
Confgured policy restrictions are defned according to the accessible device resources, services, and permissions that are granted to applications at installation
time. Such policies defne which services are o˙ered by the device and limit the device and user information accessibility. Policy restrictions are linked to context and
are confgured by the device user. We defne context according to location and time.
Location is determined basically through visible Wi-Fi access points and their respective signal strength values that allows us to di˙erentiate between nearby sub-areas
within the same work space, in addition to GPS and cellular triangulation coordi-
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nates whenever available. We implement our CBAC policies on the Android operating
system and include a tool that allows users to defne physical places such as home
or work using the captured Wi-Fi parameters. Users can even be more precise by
di˙erentiating between sub-areas within the same location, such as living rooms and
bedrooms at home or meeting rooms and oÿces at work. Once the user confgures
the device policies that defne device and application privileges according to context,
the policies will be automatically applied whenever the user is within a pre-defned
physical location and time interval.
Below, we frst present a model overview of our access control framework in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 introduces our policy constructs and their classifcation followed
by implementation and technical details in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 emphasizes our
technique in managing CI and how we keep policy restrictions up-to-date with device location. Section 3.5 reports results of experiments to assess the accuracy of CI
and the impact of policy restrictions on applications. We analyze the security of our
approach in Section 3.6.

3.1

Model Overview
In this section, we present an overview of our access control framework through

describing its components and the role of its entities.
Our framework consists of an access control mechanism that deals with access,
collection, storage, processing, and usage of context information and device policies.
To handle all the aforementioned functions, our framework design consists of four
main components as shown in Figure 3.1.
The Context Provider (CP) collects the physical location parameters (GPS,
Cell IDs, Wi-Fi parameters) through the device sensors and stores them in its own
database, linking each physical location to a user-defned logical location. It also
verifes and updates those parameters whenever the device is re-located.
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The Access Controller (AC) controls the authorizations of applications and prevents unauthorized usage of device resources or services. Even though the Android
OS has its own permission control system that checks if an application has privileges
to request resources or services, the AC complements this system with more control
methods and specifc fne-grained control permissions that better refect the application capabilities and narrow down its accessibility to resources. The AC enhances
the security of the device system since the existing Android system has some permissions that, once granted to applications, may give applications more accessibility than
they need, which malicious code can take advantage of. For example, the permission
READ_PHONE_STATE gives privileged applications a set of information such as
the phone number, the IMEI/MEID identifer, subscriber identifcation, phone state
(busy/available), SIM serial number, etc.
The Policy Manager (PM) represents the interface used to create policies,
mainly assigning application restrictions to contexts. It gives control to the user
to confgure which resources and services are accessible by applications at the given
context provided by the CP. As an example, the user through the PM can create
a policy to enable location services only when the user is at work during weekdays
between 8 am and 5 pm.
The Policy Executor (PE) enforces device restrictions by comparing the device’s
context with the confgured policies. Once an application requests access to a resource
or service, the PE checks the user-confgured restrictions set at the PM to either grant
or deny access to the application request. The PE acts as a policy enforcement by
sending the authorization information to the AC to handle application requests, and
is also responsible to resolve policy conficts and apply the most strict restrictions.
Through the PM, users can create CBAC policies through confguring application
restrictions and linking them to contexts. When an application requests a resource or
service, the AC verifes at run-time whether the application request is authorized and
forwards the request to the PE. If the request is authorized, the PE then checks if
there is any policy that corresponds to the application request. If such a policy exists,
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Fig. 3.1. Access control framework.

the PE requests from the CP to retrieve the context at the time of the application
request. The PE then compares the retrieved context with the context defned in the
policy. In case of a match, the PE enforces the corresponding policy restrictions by
reporting back to the AC to apply those restrictions on the application request.
We carefully design the access control framework so that the user-confgured policies are securely enforced with minimal processing steps and execution time to avoid
any signifcant delays in responding back to the requesting application. As our design
should securely handle policy execution, we maintain the context data provided by
the CP to make sure it is accurate, precise and up-to-date.

3.2

Policy Core Model
In this section we describe the core policy constructs that compose our CBAC

policies. We start by defning the policy constructs and then categorize our policies
according to the type of restrictions and modifcations that we need to apply to the
Android OS.
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3.2.1

Policy Constructs

We defne our CBAC policies as a set of restrictions applied to the smartphone
applications when the device is located within a specifed context. Policy restrictions
represent the constraints applied on the applications’ privileges in accessing device resources, system methods, functions, user data, and services. Policy contexts represent
to where and when the policy must be enforced.
In what follows, we assume three sets: (1) SUB the set of subjects representing
the device applications, (2) OBJ the set of protected objects (objects, for short)
representing the permissions, services, and functionalities available for the system
or applications, and (3) ACTION the set of restriction actions that can be applied
through the CBAC policies.
The set of subjects SUB is composed of the PackageNames of all applications
installed on the device. In addition, a special character  is added to the set to
represent all installed applications. This character is useful for policies that need
to be enforced on all applications, rather than creating the same policy for every
application. Moreover, we assume that each object from set OBJ has an associated
type from the set {Permission, Data, Intent, System_Peripheral}. Let o be an object
from the set OBJ ; notation type(o) denotes the type of o. The set of actions ACTION
defned for our CBAC model includes the following actions:
revoke_Permission: denys permission(s) from being granted to application(s).
shadow_Data: conceals the actual user data stored on the device.
disable_Intent: intercepts and drops the specifed intent message.
save_State: disables toggling the state (ON/OFF) of the specifed system peripheral.
Defnition 1 (Restriction.) Let s 2 SU B, o 2 OBJ, and a 2 ACT ION . A policy
restriction is defned as the tuple [s, o, a] such that:
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>
>
>
>
>
>
:
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if type(o) = Permission.
if type(o) = Data.
if type(o) = Intent.
if type(o) = System_Peripheral.

Access control policies are linked to a context that specifes where and when these
policies should be enforced. In our model, the policy context is composed of a device
location and a time interval. The device location corresponds to where a policy should
be enforced. For defning a device location, we use the reference geometric model
the describes how locations on Earth are represented. We adopt the spatial model
compliant with Open GeoSpatial Consortium (OGC) [62] that uses the notion of GIS
features. Features have a defned geometry (points, lines, or polygons) in a reference
space, with points to represent a feature with a single location in the coordinate space,
lines to represent a feature that has a linear interpolation of an ordered sequence of
points, or polygons to represent a feature that has an ordered sequence of closed lines
defning the exterior and interior boundaries of an area. Features also have types
(road, town, region) and can be given an instance for each type (Champs-Elysees,
Paris, lle-de-France).
Specifc to our CBAC policies, we defne the device location as the physical location that represents a geographically bounded feature (such as a residential and/or
commercial building), with boundaries specifying the interior area in which the device
is located. The physical location data and boundaries are obtained from the mobile
device sensors, mainly captured from GPS, cellular network, and Wi-Fi device sensors
as detailed in Section 3.4. In addition to the device physical location, users can assign
logical location names to the feature or sub-area (such as living room or work oÿce)
in which the device is located. Using these logical location names, users can reuse
them in multiple policies without the need to re-capture the device physical location
for every policy.
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On the other hand, a policy time interval represents the specifc time period
within which a policy should be enforced. We represent the specifc date and time
in the format of YYYY-MM-DD-hh:mm:ss. Additionally, we introduce the R fag to
defne recurring events. The value of R is drawn from the set {O,D,W,M,Y} defning
the event frequency: O ! once, D ! daily, W ! weekly, M ! monthly, and
Y ! yearly. An event is recurred based on the value of R and the date/time set
in the policy time interval. For example, to set an event that occurs every Monday
from 5 pm to 10 pm, R is set to W and the time interval should be set to a sample
event date-time, such as starting on 2013 − 04 − 01 − 17 : 00 : 00 and ending on
2013 − 04 − 01 − 22 : 00 : 00.
Defnition 2 (Context.) Let LOC be a logical location name representing a particular feature or sub-area. Let {ST, ET, R} respectively be the starting time, ending
time, and frequency to when a particular policy should be enforced. A policy context
is defned as the tuple [LOC, {ST, ET, R}].
Defnition 3 (Policy.) Let r be a restriction as defned in Def. 1 and c be a context
as defned in Def. 2. A policy is defned as a tuple [r, c].
Below is an example of a policy that disables the Skype application from having
the Camera permission monthly between 4.00 pm and 5.00 pm on the frst of every
month starting August 1, 2013 at our department meeting room Room110:
POLICY = [ [com.skype.raider,
android.permission.CAMERA, revoke_Permission],
[Room110,
{2013-08-01-16:00:00, 2013-08-01-17:00:00, M} ] ]

3.2.2

Policy Categories and Examples

We here classify location dependent run-time policies according to the type of
restrictions and modifcations that we need to apply on the Android OS. Table 3.1
displays examples of policy restrictions for each policy category.
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Table 3.1.
Policy categories and examples.
Policy Category

Example

Policy Restriction [s,o,a]

Resource Restriction Policies

Disable Camera for Skype

[ com.skype.raider, android.permission.CAMERA, revoke_Permission ]

System Peripheral State Policies

Disbale Bluetooth toggling

[ *, BLUETOOTH, Save_State ]

Multitasking and Intercommunication Policies

Disable loading a browser activity

[ *, Intent.ACTION_VIEW, Uri.parse, disable_Intent ]

User Security Policies

Disable uninstalling applications

[ *, android.intent.action.DELETE, disable_Intent ]

3.3

Implementation
In this section, we introduce the technical details of our implementation which

includes our modifcations to the Android OS and the components of the Policy
Manager custom application that acts as an intermediary between the OS and the
user’s desired policy confgurations.

3.3.1

Policy Manager Components

The Policy Manager custom application consists of the four main Android application components: Activities, Broadcast Receivers, a Content Provider, and a
Service.
Activities: The user interacts with the Policy Manager via activities, and through
these activities, a user is able to defne physical locations and subsequently confgure a set of policies for these locations. The main constituents of these activities
include Application Events, Permission Access, Resource Access, System Preferences,
and Time Restriction.
BroadcastReceiver: We extended the Android’s BroadcastReceiver class and
created two custom classes, the StartLocationServiceReceiver and the BootReceiver
classes. The StartLocationServiceReceiver is responsible for triggering our customized
LocationService for retrieving device location information. The BootReceiver’s main
task is to schedule when the StartLocationServiceReceiver should request the location
service. Once the BootReceiver receives the BOOT_COMPLETED Intent from the
system, it uses the Android’s AlarmManager service to let the receiver schedule a
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pending Intent to be sent periodically to our StartLocationServiceReceiver in order
to update the device location.
Service: The LocationService service is derived from the IntentService class that
facilitates o˜oading work from the main application’s thread, allowing tasks to be
performed in the background on a separate thread if desired. LocationService determines if the device has moved to or still is in a previously registered area. O˜oading
the aggregation of location-based data in a separate thread reduces the performance
impact of the execution of the LocationService on the Policy Manager. We use the
AlarmManager to periodically activate the LocationService to ensure the device’s location is always up-to-date. By default, the LocationService is activated once per
minute, but we give the user the choice to confgure how often the service is executed. The duration of the service depends on the number of snapshots of location
parameters to be taken, which is currently confgured to four per area.
Content Provider: The policies confgured by the user are stored within the
Policy Manager data directory. This data is private to our custom application and
cannot be accessed by other applications or the system itself, as a result of Linux’s
kernel user ID access control mechanisms. PolicyCP is our custom content provider
that acts as a secure intermediary between the policy database and all objects outside
of the Policy Manager’s running process. We chose to use the SQLite database to
store user-confgured policies due to the support and ease of programming provided
by the Android API’s associated with storing and managing databases on Android
devices.
We provide some built-in policies that are pre-confgured and can easily be modifed to achieve the required user needs. Moreover, we can also refer to existing
usability techniques [63–66] that can be used to o˙er regular users with preset and
adapted policy confgurations.
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3.3.2

Permission Management

In the Android system, all resources that require explicit access rights in the
form of permissions are protected by the ActivityManagerService class via permission
verifcation. When an application attempts to use any of these resources, the ActivityManagerService’s method called checkComponentPermission is invoked to verify if
the calling application has the appropriate permission(s) to access the resource.
We apply our modifcations to this particular method by simply intercepting the
permission call before the system performs its standard permission verifcation process. Given the permission and the application name, the system subsequently calls
our custom content provider’s revokeResourceAccess to determine the next course of
action. Depending on the user’s policy confguration, the next course of action could
either be returning the constant PackageManager.DENIED in the checkComponentPermission if the user has confgured to block that permission from the requesting
application, or letting the normal verifcation process take its course. We also give
the ability to revoke any or all permissions system-wide via the PolicyManager’s
interface.

3.3.3

Restrictions on User Data

Our implementation of data obfuscation complements many of the techniques
previously used in [46] and [6], but instead under the domain of CBAC policy restrictions. We obfuscate user data from applications attempting to access it if the policy
restriction applies to those applications. We modify the Android APIs that access
the user data saved on the device.
Relational database systems are the common data management systems used to
create, store, and manage user data. Accessing these data usually require calling the
ContentResolver’s query() method, and thus we modify it for our purposes. Instead
of returning the expected Cursor object needed to point to the required data, a
NullCursor object is substituted. A NullCursor object represents an empty dataset,
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such as an empty list of pictures as if pictures were not present or never stored on
the device.

3.3.4

Managing System Peripheral State

We also give users the option to confgure a policy to restrict access to peripherals (e.g., Bluetooth) when entering a particular location. Specifcally, users can set
up their devices to prevent applications from modifying a peripheral’s current state
(enabled/disabled). While it is possible to modify a peripheral’s current state by
using permission management, we modify the specifc methods that enable/disables
these peripherals in order to prevent applications from crashing that do not have
code for handling exceptions resulting from revocation of permissions. As an example, for Bluetooth we modifed the BluetoothAdapter class and for Wi-Fi we modifed
the WifManager class so to assure that these modifcations do not result in application crashes and to prevent applications from modifying peripherals current state.
Whenever an application tries to modify the state of a system peripheral, our content
provider PolicyCP checks the validity of the request and would refuse the request if
the request tries to override a user-confgured restriction.

3.3.5

Intent Management

Intent messages are one of the common forms for inter- and intra-communication
between application components, sent via three methods: startActivity(), sendBroadcast(), and startService(). Preventing an application from sending intents is simply
a matter of intercepting the intents when the aforementioned methods are called by
applications. Intent interception provides the user the ability to prevent an application component from starting another activity, broadcasting any possible sensitive
information, or executing a possibly suspicious background service. For example,
without the need of declaring the Android permission "RECORD_AUDIO", an application can indirectly access the device’s microphone recorder application by re-
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Table 3.2.
Examples of policy restrictions that can be controlled via intercepting Intents.
Restriction Category

Description

Application Install/Uninstall

Prevent an application from sending an intent
to install or uninstall an application.

Application Multitasking

Prevent running multiple user-application simultaneously.

Services

Prevent applications from starting background services.

Broadcasts

Prevent applications from broadcasting Intents.

Application Launching

Prevent certain applications from running on the device.

Lock/Unlock Device

Preventing requesting pin code to unlock the device.

questing the Activity class to send a record audio intent. Therefore, we modifed the
Activity class which hosts startActivity() and startActivityForResult(), and the ContextWrapper class which contains sendBroadcast() and startService(). We modifed
these methods to intercept the Intents and control the actions performed based on
those Intent objects.
We classify these Intents based on the contents and description of the intent
objects. The user is given, via the Policy Manager interface, the ability to prevent a
specifc set of Intents from being sent. Table 3.2 lists few examples of these Intentrelated restrictions.
Launching applications is achieved by intercepting those intents and preventing
applications from being started either by users or by other applications. The frst
method is when users launch applications through the default Android Launcher
application, which is the home screen of the device. The second method for starting another application is calling its activity within an already opened application.
We extract the action and category from the Intent object, and verify if it is "android.intent.action.MAIN" and "android.intent.category.LAUNCHER", respectively.
If those specifc contents are present and if the simultaneous running of applications
is restricted, we discard the intent preventing the framework to handle it.
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Finally, through the Intent management, users can control when to request a pin
code when unlocking the device. In our implementation, we modify the KeyguardViewMediator class in order to intercept the locking operation of the device, and thus
controlling when a PIN is required.
To summarize, users will have all the options to specify applications restrictions
associated with context data through the policy managers. In the policy manager, the
permission management is used to confgure application restrictions related to device
resources (e.g. Camera). Restrictions on user data are used to shadow user data
(usually saved in relational databases) and to return fake data to the application (e.g.
Contacts). Managing system peripheral state is used to control applications actions
in toggling the state of certain resources (e.g. enabling/disabling Bluetooth). Finally,
intent management is used to control the communication between applications and
flter user and application actions on the system. Intent management is also used
to confgure restrictions on applications accessing resources, as in some cases, these
applications are developed to access system resources indirectly through using an
intent message rather than requesting a permission.

3.4

Context Management
The main source of location-related information for our access control system is

the Wi-Fi Access Points (AP) and their corresponding signal strengths. Location
information acquired from GPS and cellular towers is also aggregated to our context defnition but may not be suÿcient for indoor localization especially that they
may become weak or unavailable inside buildings or areas within building structures [67, 68]. However, location information retrieved from Wi-Fi parameters could
be more precise to di˙erentiate between closely located sub-areas within the same
GPS location [69, 70].
A spatial region is represented by combining GPS coordinates, cellular triangulation location data, and Wi-Fi APs and signal strengths. In Android, the GPS
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coordinates and cellular triangulation are obtained in a similar fashion by invoking
the Android LocationManager service. Once the LocationManager is invoked, we request location updates by calling the requestLocationUpdates method that returns a
Location object which contains latitude, longitude, timestamp, and other information.
Wi-Fi is handled di˙erently than the previous two location methods. We obtain
the Wi-Fi parameters by invoking the WifManager service to retrieve the Wi-Fi
access points scans. We register our BroadcastReceiver mWif_receiver with an IntentFiler action to receive the broadcasted Wi-Fi scanned intent, and then request
for and subsequently process the actual scanned access points data.
In our CBAC policy system, we provide users with a utility to either capture the
physical location of the device or to manually enter the device location coordinates.
In the following sections, we show our design and implementation of the location
capturing phase and detection phase and how the device’s context is matched with a
pre-defned policy context.

Fig. 3.2. Location capturing phase.
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3.4.1

Location Capturing Phase

Figure 3.2 describes how location data is captured for each context defned by
the user. Through the location scan interface, the user is able to capture several
snapshots of location data in di˙erent sub-areas. For each sub-area, location data is
accumulated from each snapshot; the GPS coordinates and the cellular triangulation,
when applicable, import the latitude and longitude from the captured snapshots and
only select those with the highest position accuracy. With respect to Wi-Fi, we
noticed that the Wi-Fi access points signal strengths fuctuate even if the device is
stationary or motionless. Therefore, our application scans the signal strengths of
each access point for several seconds gathering the RSSI values at each particular
sub-area. We conduct the scans with no other users in the vicinity as the presence of
other users would a˙ect the RSSI values [9,71]. Finally, the accumulated data, which
mainly consists of Wi-Fi access points with signal strength ranges in addition to GPS
and cellular triangulation data as supporting location information, will represent the
device’s physical location.
Any location that is not defned by the user or does not have location information
saved on the device will be considered “Unregistered”. Therefore, we designate a
default policy restrictions for the user to confgure whenever the device is located in
an unregistered location. In addition, we allow users to register locations that have
not been previously visited. This is achieved through either manually entering the
publicly known longitude and latitude of the desired location, or by acquiring the
fne-grained Wi-Fi parameters from other devices who have saved those parameters.
This becomes very practical when the user is switching between two devices and needs
to import previously saved policy contexts to the new device.
Our implementation does not store all the GPS or triangulated cellular coordinates
acquired, rather a subset of those coordinates that bound into a convex hull and their
associated precision. The points in the interior of the convex hull are discarded. We
also only store the RSSI range for each distinct Wi-Fi access point scanned. This
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range is the minimum and maximum RSSI values aggregated from all the sub-areas
for each access point. A sub-area is therefore represented as a range of Wi-Fi signal
strength values at the least, and if with high position accuracy, also a representation
of a convex hull of GPS or triangulated cellular coordinates.

Fig. 3.3. Location detection phase.

3.4.2

Location Detection Phase

Figure 3.3 describes how device context is detected and matched with pre-defned
context. Periodically, the location background service is re-instantiated to accumulate
location-context data to determine the device’s current whereabouts. Like when
registering and scanning a sub-area in the location capturing phase, we scan the
device’s location-related data. The list of user-registered areas that have a subset of
the scanned neighboring access points are extracted from the database frst. Matching
distinct access points is computationally less expensive than determining if coordinate
position falls within the boundaries of a convex hull. Then, using the current signal
strengths of the access points, we reduce the list to only a set of “best-match” list of
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physical locations whose access points fall within the current captured signal strength
values. If the current scanned GPS or cell network coordinates fall within the convex
hull of the associated sub-area, then it is highly likely that the sub-area has been
located.
In the unlikely situation when the “best-match” list of physical locations contain
more than one location, the user is given the list to confrm his/her location. Even
though this event is unlikely to happen, it may still occur because Wi-Fi access point’s
signal strengths are volatile; their signal strengths fuctuate at a given location. As
a consequence, an access point’s signal may be, at some point, too weak for the
Android’s device sensor regardless of whether the device is in motion or stationary.
In the location capturing phase, we aggregate the retrieved data that records a range
of RSSI values from di˙erent sub-areas within the same location, for example, instead
of just a single snapshot. In the detection phase, however, we take a snapshot of
the location data, which may have only a subset of the previously aggregated data.
We compare the previously stored values with the snapshot data. Specifcally, with
respect to Wi-Fi, we determine if the captured RSSI value of a particular access
point is within the stored range. We perform this operation for each access point
captured in the snapshot and count the number of tests passed, which is the basis in
determining the physical location of the device.

3.5

Experimental Results
In this section, we report experimental results about the CBAC mechanism and

evaluate its impact on the device system and applications. Our modifcations to
the Android source code were tested on the Android Nexus 4 cellular device and
Android Nexus 7 tablet running the Android 4.2.2 OS (API level v. 17). We ran
the top 250 applications from the Google Play market for testing and evaluating our
modifcations. Each experiment has been carried out with the help of the Android
Debug Bridge (ADB) utility by using the command “adb logcat”. We inserted logging
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commands in various parts of the operating systems where modifcations were made
to observe, for example, application access events.

Fig. 3.4. Tested areas in one of our campus buildings.

Experiment 1: Location Detection Accuracy. The goal of this experiment
is to evaluate the accuracy of the location detection algorithm used in our CBAC
mechanism. We measure the number of success and failure detections per sub-area.
Figure 3.4 displays the schematics of one building where we performed some of our
experiments. The large, grid-pattern rectangles point out main locations or areas,
identifed by numbers. Areas outside the rectangles are considered “unregistered.”
The black circles indicate the specifc sub-areas examined during the location capturing phase. All other colors indicate other sub-areas examined during the detection
phase.
Figure 3.4 shows three tested rooms located on the same foor. However, our
experimentation included several buildings and areas. In each room, we chose at
least four spots to participate in the location capturing phase to accumulate locationrelated data, in order to construct a robust set of location parameters per room to
be stored in the database. In each location, we analyzed three sub-areas, indicated
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by ’A’, ’B’, or ’C’ and measure the detection rate in each of these subareas. For
that particular foor which contains over 15 Wi-Fi access points, we captured the top
5 Wi-Fi access points per snapshot with the highest signal strength for each tested
sub-area.

Fig. 3.5. Detection accuracy rate of closely located areas.

Figure 3.5 displays the detection accuracy rate in the 3 sub-areas of rooms 1, 2
and 3. At each of the sub-areas of each room, we performed 50 location tests and
counted the number of successful detections. Our experimental results show that the
successful detection rates were up to 91%, and in the worst case scenario we had up to
29% of incorrect detections. This experimental result was complemented by testing
several “unregistered” areas around the registered rooms. We detected 16% of false
positives, that is, unregistered areas that appeared to be user-defned. Within the
registered areas, the values of the signal strengths of matching Wi-Fi access points
fell within the range of signal strengths frst acquired during the location capturing
phase. However, in the unregistered areas, especially the further away the device was
when the snapshots at the location capturing phase were taken, the values fell outside
the stored range because of building structures hindering the Wi-Fi signal strengths.
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Experiment 2: Impact of Permission Restrictions. The purpose of this
experiment is to observe the impact of permission-related policy restrictions on applications. Specifcally, we are interested in whether or not an application crashes as
a result of being denied a permission that was initially granted at installation time.
Therefore, we performed a stress test on each application and observed the impact on
the application upon revoking its permissions when requesting a service or resource.
We performed our experiment on 245 Android applications and used the ADB logging
utility to view the permission being revoked when the checkComponentPermission()
method is called.

Fig. 3.6. Impact of permission revoking on applications.

Figure 3.6 shows the percentage of application crashes upon performing the stress
test on each permission. We counted an application as crashing even if it crashed
during the execution of one minor functionality. The main cause of these crashes
is due to the developers’ mishandling the denial of previously granted permissions.
Since application crashes are due to developers’ mishandling the denial of previously
granted permissions to their applications, application crashes can be prevented if
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Table 3.3.
Time overhead for modifed Android methods.
Android Method

Overhead (ms)

checkComponentPermission(..)

12.220

Intent-startActivity(..)

12.708

Intent-startService(..)

5.402

Intent-sendBroadcast(..)

5.208

User Data-ContentResolver(..)

12.300

Device Peripherals-setEnable(..)

8.351

error-handling is added whenever an application attempts to access a resources or
request a service. In fact, throughout testing several application versions, we realized
that the number of application crashes has been decreasing over time. This is because
developers are now aware that not having the permission error-mishandling script is
causing several application crashes. A script is thus being added in their application
updates especially with the evolvement of many permission restriction techniques.
Experiment 3: Performance Overhead. The purpose of this experiment is
to evaluate the timing overhead introduced by our modifcations to the Android OS.
We calculate the amount of time it takes for our modifed methods to fully execute
once called by applications. We also compare the execution times of these methods
before our modifcations to estimate the overhead introduced by our modifcations.
Specifcally, we measure the overhead time caused by intercepting application permissions, user data accesses (e.g. Contacts), Intent messages, and access to system
peripherals (e.g. Bluetooth).
Table 3.3 reports in milliseconds the time imposed on these methods. As the
results show, the overall delay introduced by enforcing our CBAC policies is not
perceivable by the end-user.
Experiment 4: System Memory Overhead. The purpose of this experiment
is to measure the amount of memory overhead placed on the system after our modifcations. Mainly, we aim to observe the changes in memory usage caused by our
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application restrictions and by the LocationService method that continuously run in
the background for context updates.

Fig. 3.7. Memory overhead with and without our CBAC policy restrictions.

Figure 3.7 shows that the memory usage when enforcing our CBAC policies closely
matches the memory usage when these policies are not enforced. Even though our
experiments test the di˙erent restriction categories separately as shown in the fgure,
we believe that the observed memory overheard is due to the LocationService that is
instantiated periodically to keep the device’s context up-to-date.
Experiment 5: Battery Consumption. The purpose of this experiment is to
observe the Android device’s battery consumption change when CBAC policies are
enforced compared to when they are not. For this purpose, we monitored the device’s
battery percentage when running both the unmodifed OS and our customized system,
separately. In both cases, we forced the device’s screen to never turn o˙ with Wi-Fi
and GPS enabled, a representation of a somehow worst case scenario as when the
user is continuously using the device for that duration. Since the period for which
the LocationService method t hat is responsible for checking the device’s location
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can be customized by the user, we tested the battery consumption for di˙erent time
periods for the purpose of getting a fair evaluation.

Fig. 3.8. Device battery consumption when checking for context updates every 30 seconds.

We started our experiment by setting the device to check for any device location
updates every 30 seconds. Figure 3.8 shows that the battery percentage displayed on
the device when enforcing our CBAC policies drops ˘ 5% less per hour compared
to when the policies are not enforced. We achieved similar results when context
was updated every 45 seconds. However, when we set the timer to check for device
context every 60 seconds or above, the battery usage percentage of when the CBAC
policies are enforced closely matches the battery consumption when the policies are
not enforced.
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3.6

Security Analysis
In this section, we present a security analysis of our implementation of the CBAC

system to analyze possible threats from a malicious user or applications that can
bypass our policy restrictions. The aim of our security analysis is to identify possible
threats by malicious users or applications that can bypass CBAC policies and to
mitigate these threats.
Colluding Applications. In Android, each device application is assigned a
unique UserID (UID) that the system uses to refer to an application. However, if two
applications are created and signed by the same developer, the system will give both
applications the same UID, which gives these applications the ability to share the
same processes if needed [72]. The stock Android OS applies its security policies not
based on the application label or its package name, but rather on the process UID. In
our modifcations of the OS, we obtain the name of the package (application) which is
performing an action by calling the PackageManager’s getPackagesForUid(int uid).
This way, our restrictions are not based on UID but are transformed in order to
refer to the package name. As an example of such threat, consider two applications,
Application A and Application B, that share the same UID. Suppose that the user
blocks access to GPS capabilities from application A. However, although successfully
blocked, application A may still be able to acquire information about the user’s or
device’s location because Application B was not denied access to GPS. In our system,
we prevent such threat by blocking all package names associated with a UID using
the getPackageForUid() method.
Circumventing Application Multitasking Restriction. A malicious developer may attempt to bypass the restriction that disallows multiple applications from
running simultaneously by creating a custom launcher-like app. Android is modular, and thus the default home screen can be replaced. Our system is not vulnerable to such an attack because we check all possible intents as our system is
not limited to intents related to the stock Launcher. Thus any intent with "an-
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droid.intent.action.MAIN" and "android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" will be intercepted and processed to disable multitasking of any launcher the user decides to use.
Protection of Policies. As users can confgure policy restrictions based on time
and location, these restrictions are either applied system-wide or per application. If
these policy restrictions can be altered by applications, then any malicious application
can perform specifc attacks based on policy confgurations. To protect policies, we
thus do not allow write privileges to be granted on policies so to prevent policies from
being modifed.
Malicious applications that are aware of our CBAC policies may try to drop a policy or modify the device’s detected context so that the wrong policy is applied. However, in our implementation we retrieve context information directly from the system
protected APIs that cannot be altered by applications. Moreover, context information is managed by our Content Provider that gathers such information regardless of
which applications are running on the device or services requested by applications.
This independency from the Content Provider gives robustness in gathering context
data that is forwarded to the Policy Manager as discussed in Section 3.1.
Sensitive Information Disclosure. Some applications may maliciously leak
private user information once they detect that a previously granted privileged application is revoked. As an example, a malicious application that was granted access
to Camera and GPS at installation time may upload the device GPS location to the
application server once it detects that the CAMERA permission is revoked, leaking
the user-private location. For this reason, our implementation provides the user, at
the time of policy confgurations, with a list of privileges that are still granted to the
confgured applications, acting as a warning for the user to be aware of the sensitive
information still accessible by the confgured applications in a particular context.
Continuous Running Application Processes. When an application requests
access to a resource, the Android OS checks if the application has the appropriate
permission(s) just at the time of the request. If the user-confgured policy grants such
permission to the requesting application in a given context, some processes associated
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with certain resources may continuously run even if the device is later located in a
di˙erent context for which the user has denied access to such resource. The reason
is that permission granting is not checked continuously while the process is running,
rather is only checked when the request is issued. Malicious applications may take
advantage of this, for example by continuously recording audio in one context while
transitioning to another context.
Audio recording using the Microphone resource is one example of a continuously
running process that will not terminate until the recording is stopped. Take for example a user who attends private meetings in a same meeting room that he confgured a
policy to disable the Microphone resource. A malicious application can begin recording outside of the meeting room area without alerting the user, and continue recording
when the user enters the restricted meeting room. The Android OS does not continuously verify whether an application has audio recording permission during recording.
It verifes each time a request is made, and thus when approved the application can
continue using the peripheral for that specifc session. Our implementation prevents
this type of attack. Once a registered area is associated with a restriction on video or
record audio access, the location service forces the applications with the associated
permissions in their AndroidManifest.xml to close.

3.7

Conclusion
We proposed a modifed version of the Android OS, which we refer to as CBAC,

supporting context-based access control policies. These policies restrict applications
from accessing specifc data and/or resources based on the user context. The restrictions specifed in a policy are automatically applied as soon as the user device
matches the pre-defned context associated with the policy. Our experimental results
show the e˙ectiveness of these policies on the Android system and applications, and
the accuracy in locating the device within a user-defned context using mainly RSSI
values from WiFi access points.
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CBAC, however, has limitations. CBAC is a user-centric approach to device management in order to protect sensitive content on the device. This user-centric approach
to confguring policies for end-users’ devices may not be suitable for enterprises that
require strong security guarantees. A critical security issue in enterprise environments
is the inability of enterprises to (fully) trust employees to perform necessary tasks to
secure enterprise content. Assuming an employee is benign with no malicious intent,
the employee may incorrectly confgure his/her device policies. Enterprises must
also consider insider threats within the organization. That is, employees with malicious intent may purposefully leak sensitive enterprise content stored on their devices.
Enterprise content may not only exist on mobile devices, which is an assumption implicitly made in this chapter. Content may also exist in remote servers which can
be accessed via mobile devices. In addition, the proposed mechanism does not consider that access to content may be contingent upon the presence of other users in
the area in which the user requesting access is located. The next chapter, Chapter
4, addresses such concerns and limitations by proposing a context-aware access control system that incorporates proximity-based constraints when access to enterprise
content is remotely requested.
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4. SECURING REMOTE ENTERPRISE CONTENT VIA
PROXIMITY-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
The previous chapter addresses the issue of localizing the user and adapting applications’ access to client-side content depending on the user’s location and time of
access. However, the proposed system had several limitations which include localizing the user with untrusted client-side technology, lack of consideration of other
users within proximity when sensitive content is accessed, and delegating the user to
appropriately confgure access control policies.
To support PrBAC scenarios such as Separation of Duty (SoD) and Absence of
Other Users (AOU), we proposed the frst iteration of our Context-Aware System to
Secure Enterprise Content (CASSEC). CASSEC took a wireless, infrastructure-based
approach to achieve the localization of occupants within a monitored space which
enables geo-spatial RBAC [15, 33]. A wireless, infrastructure-based approach makes
the system more resilient to malicious attacks; we assumed, for example, the least
amount of trust in users since users may attempt to circumvent the access control
process by not manually reporting their location or providing false location data.
In addition, the architectural model allowed a fuid context-sensitive authorization
process, thereby enabling zero interaction authorization (i.e., it did not require user
intervention). We frst showed how to enforce SoD by using Bluetooth MAC addresses
of Client devices of nearby occupants as proof-of-location, which enabled the system
to determine who was in a given space. We then showed how to enforce AOU by
exploiting the degradation of WiFi received signal strength as a result of humaninduced interference when people are near access points, which enabled the system to
determine how many people were in a given space. With such information obtained
passively by a Proximity Module (PM), the Authorization Server (AS) component
was able to enforce PrBAC policies whenever an authenticated Client requested from
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the Enterprise Content Server (ECS) component access to resources depending on
the presence, or lack thereof, of users. Figure 4.1 displays CASSEC’s architectural
components.

Fig. 4.1. CASSEC’s proximity-based access control architecture. Arrows indicate secure wireless network communication.

Our frst iteration of CASSEC, however, has several drawbacks. First, it does not
take into account the phenomena of radio signals permeating through walls. Multiple proximity modules residing in adjacent proximity zones would simultaneously
detect the same Bluetooth-enabled Client, when in fact, the Client only existed in
one of said proximity zones. As a result, such a benign occurrence is automatically
inferred as malicious activity. Given that Bluetooth’s omni-directional transmission
range is 10m (˘33 ft), the number of false attack detections may increase in standard
enterprise settings, such as small oÿces or conference rooms. A non-negligible false
detection rate is a major drawback that hinders the practicality and ease-of-adoption
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of the solution. Second, the system was susceptible to observable Bluetooth manipulation (see Section 4.7), such as an unauthorized individual obtaining an authorized
user’s phone, whether by theft or voluntary provision. If such an attack occurs, the
unauthorized individual can gain access to restricted resources s/he would normally
otherwise not have access to.
To address such context monitoring issues, we further investigate techniques that
leverage existing contextual information from both the physical and computing realms.
Contextual information extracted from the environment can help a context-aware system in inferring the situation of entities within that environment. However, being able
to infer the correct or more probable conclusion w.r.t. the situation of an entity highly
depends on the reliability of the extracted contextual information. Reliability could
be measured, for example, by the level of accuracy, precision, or security in using a
technique or technology (e.g., occupancy detection or biometric authentication) to
extract or process contextual information. With respect to security, a context-aware
system may also need to adapt its access control decisions to the degree of reliability
of such information. Given the dynamic nature of EED scenarios and idiosyncratic
phenomenon observed in radio-based occupancy detection technologies, it is essential
that context-aware systems emulate a sentient characteristic when making inferred decisions: confdence. Access control policies should incorporate confdence constructs
when specifying contextual restrictions.
In this chapter, we thus propose a major extension to CASSEC, which we refer
to as CASSEC 2.0, by adding confdence constructs to the location and role constructs in PrBAC policies. In addition, we conduct a feasibility study to show that
the approach is viable within an enterprise environment, which can be achieved via
preexisting technologies and solutions integrated within the enterprise’s mobile IT infrastructure. Through the location construct, a policy can specify that resource access
authorization is granted only if the context-aware system can determine to a specifed
probability that a user is in a room. We employ Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) capabilities of PMs and Clients to perform continuous co-proximity authentication, and
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use BLE beacons transmitted during this authentication phase to provide a certain
degree of confdence that the Client is in a particular proximity zone, even when multiple PMs in adjacent rooms detect the same Client. Through the role construct, a
policy can specify that access to resources is only granted if the system can determine
with high confdence whether the current user of a Client device is the true owner of
the device. We leverage accelerometer and fngerprint sensors within smartphones to
achieve behavioral and physiological biometric authentication. Behavioral biometric
authentication is achieved by passively analyzing the gait patterns of the Client’s
current user via the smartphone’s accelerometer. Although human gait is behavioral
and resistant to signifcant change over time, various factors can slightly infuence the
extracted gait features at runtime [73]. Consequently, if the Client cannot passively
identify the current user through runtime gait measurements with high levels of assurance, the Client will take an active approach and request the user to authenticate
him/herself via the fngerprint sensor (i.e., physiological biometric authentication)
when the user next requests access to resources.
The CASSEC 2.0 system has thus the following contributions:
1. Confdence Constructs: We incorporate confdence specifers into context-based
access control policies. More specifcally, we incorporate such specifers into
PrBAC’s role and location constructs, thereby enabling the CASSEC 2.0 system to factor in the degree of reliability of contextual information during authentication and authorization processes.
2. Feasibility Study: We conduct a feasibility study to show that the approach
of CASSEC 2.0 is viable in a practical enterprise setting. We leverage solutions within an enterprise’s preexisting IT infrastructure to evaluate confdence
constructs, and apply such constructs to biometric and co-proximity authentication.
3. Co-Proximity Authentication: We provide a timed challenge-response protocol using BLE beacons as our underlying co-proximity authentication technol-
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ogy. The protocol prevents an adversary, who has modifed his device’s unique
user ID, from impersonating another user. However, our study shows that using distance-bounding techniques over BLE beacons is a feasible defense only
against a sophisticated attacker able to execute relay attacks under a certain
adversarial model.
4. Biometric Authentication: We leverage behavioral and physiological biometric
authentication to evaluate confdence specifers. Our study shows that our approach is feasible as we are able to verify that the current user of the Client
device is the true owner with high confdence when the phone is placed on the
hip and within the pocket, respectively.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 introduces proximity-based scenarios and specifc examples that motivate this work. We then briefy discuss background
information on biometric authentication techniques in Section 4.2. We provide in Section 4.3 a PrBAC policy specifcation for CASSEC 2.0. Section 4.4 establishes our
system’s assumption. Section 4.5 introduces the architecture and underlying components of our approach. Section 4.6 discusses implementation details followed by
a report of data collected from our use case study. We analyze the security of our
approach in Section 4.7. Section 4.8 concludes the chapter.

4.1

Motivating Scenarios
In what follows, we present scenarios motivating the need for context-aware sys-

tems in which access to sensitive resources must be controlled based on proximity
parameters.
Consider a military organization with monitored government facilities such as
restricted military bases or buildings. Military personnel are assigned roles that refect
ranking and privileges. The roles General and Private are assigned to the highest- and
lowest-ranking personnel in the army, respectively. In terms of accessing restricted
facilities or resources, the former is granted many privileges, while the latter has very
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few. Consider also the role Civilian, which indicates an individual operating outside
of the military organization, and who is granted no privileges. Suppose that three
military personnel, two Generals and one Private, are granted access to documents
classifed up to the level of top secret and restricted, respectively, according to a
multi-level security model.
Separation of Duty Scenario. A document classifed as top secret is highly
sensitive, and requires that at least two personnel with the role General be present
in order for it to be accessed. The document is accessed via desktop terminal and is
stored within a designated, but restricted oÿce in which only Generals are allowed to
enter.
This scenario refects the security principle SoD. That is, two or more people are responsible for cooperatively completing a task. In addition, the circumstances requires
that said document must be accessed at a specifc location.
Absence of Other Users Scenario. A document classifed as restricted, but
with the additional caveat "for your eyes only", requires that a specifc Private can
access it via smartphone mobile, however, only if no other individuals are present at
the time of access.
Such an absence-based restriction not only includes military personnel of various
rankings, but also individuals that assume the role of Civilian. Civilians are often
temporarily recruited to work on military projects, but are highly monitored and
usually given only the set of privileges needed to complete the project and nothing
more. We note that, unlike the SoD scenario, in this AOU scenario the document can
be accessed via the Private’s smartphone device in any location including locations
that Civilians may have access to. Therefore, less infrastructure is required as it is
not necessary to know the identity of every person in the Private’s vicinity.
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4.2

Background
Biometric information characterizes measurable human biological features [74].

Most biometric features are unique per person and can be found in every individual.
In the context of security, biometric authentication refers to techniques that rely on
such features to uniquely identify and validate the identity of an individual. Human
biometrics can be classifed into two types: physiological and behavioral. Physiological biometric authentication is based on static physical attributes such as fngerprints,
iris, retina, or facial features, whereas behavioral biometric authentication relies on
identifable characteristics of a user’s behavior that typically do not change over time
such as keystroke dynamics, signature, or gait.
At a high level, biometric authentication has two phases: enrollment and authentication. Before authentication can occur, an individual must frst be enrolled into
the system by extracting and storing his/her biometric data within a template. Later
in the authentication phase when the identity of the individual must be verifed, the
biometric data collected at runtime is compared to the previously constructed template. From this comparison, a similarity matching score is produced, and whether
an individual is accepted/rejected (i.e., non-/identifed) depends on a threshold set
for the system. In this system, we employ both physiological and behavioral biometric authentication for user verifcation using two techniques: fngerprint and gait
recognition. Modern mobile devices already have integrated solutions to enroll and
authenticate users via fngerprint scanning technology [31]. However, such devices
lack gait recognition solutions. We therefore only describe user verifcation via gait
recognition below.

User Verifcation via Gait Recognition
Lee and Grimson defned gait as "an idiosyncratic feature of a person that is
determined by, among other things, an individual’s weight, limb length, footwear, and
posture combined with characteristic motion. Hence, gait can be used as a biometric
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measure to recognize known persons and classify unknown subjects" [73]. Empirical
evidence supports this defnition as researchers have conducted experiments which
analyzed over 700 users’ gait patterns and found gait patterns to be unique [75]. As
a result, it is possible to verify whether the user of a mobile device is the true owner
of that device.
Gait recognition for the purpose of user verifcation is not novel [74], nor is it the
focus of this chapter. The main approaches to measuring and analyzing gait biometric
are machine vision, foor sensor, and wearable sensor. Deploying additional hardware
incurs additional costs, as is the case in the frst two approaches. Fortunately, state-ofthe-art cellular devices are embedded with a set of sensors, including accelerometers,
which have now become a standard for modern smartphones. Consequently, we only
employ a wearable sensor approach. We leverage a recent work proposed by Ren et
al. [76] for several reasons: (1) it utilizes readily available accelerometers embedded
within smartphones to detect possible user spoofng in mobile healthcare systems;
(2) it takes into account the fact that computational resources are limited on mobile
devices; and (3) it is robust to variations in users’ walking speed. See Section 4.5 for
more details.

4.3

Policy Specifcation
Several research e˙orts have focused on the design of access control policy lan-

guages [32, 33, 41, 42, 77, 78]. In this section we introduce a simple, yet expressive
policy specifcation (Table 4.1) that leverages existing policy languages. We adopt
the syntactical structure of XACML, which is an XML-based language for access control, and apply it in defning proximity-based RBAC policies for CASSEC 2.0. The
terms in quotes ’ ’ represent static tokens. The terms in italics indicate functions.
As it is standard in RBAC policies, a role is a job function that represents a
set of privileges to perform actions on objects. An object is a data construct that
is acted upon by a subject that has assumed a role. An action is an appropriate
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Table 4.1.
PrBAC policy language
<Policies> ::= ’Begin’ <policy-list> ’End’
<policy-list> ::= <policy> <policy-list> | <policy>
<policy> ::= <role-predicate> <object> <action> (<context>)
<role-predicate> ::= <role> (<confdence>) | <ranking>’(’<role>’)’ (<confdence>)
<confdence> ::= <digit>
<digit> ::= [’0’-’9’]
<ranking> ::= equal | inferior | superior
<action> ::= read | write | delete ...
<context> ::= <obligation> <location-constraint> | <obligation> <location-constraint> <proximityconstraints>
<obligation> ::= prior | while
<location-constraint> ::= <topology> <location> (<confdence>)
<topology> ::= in | out | adjacent ...
<proximity-constraints> ::= <proximity-constraint> <proximity-constraints> | <proximity-constraint>
<proximity-constraint> ::= <cardinality> <digit> <role-predicate> <location-constraint>
<cardinality> ::= at_least | at_most

57

Fig. 4.2. Two example proximity-based access control policies.

operation that can be applied to an object. We assume that users of our system
may be mobile, and therefore, we incorporate usage controls regarding continuity of
access [42]. An obligation specifes that certain constraints must be satisfed prior
to or while accessing an object. A topology indicates a relation between the role and
the location within the spatial domain. Often in enterprise environments, access to
restricted resources is contingent on not only the presence (or absence) of other people,
but the relation towards the individual requesting access. A role-predicate specifes
a specifc role or relational function that takes the role of the requesting user and
outputs a ranking relative to that role (i.e., superior(roleOfRequestingUser)). Last,
an entity designated to enforce a policy may need prerequisites to be fulflled, at least
to a certain in extent. A confdence indicates the numerical threshold at which a
requirement must be fulflled, otherwise anything below that threshold is considered a
policy violation. For example, specifying a role (General) with a confdence constraint
(80%) semantically states that the system must be "80%" sure that the current user
is the General. Figure 4.2 provides two examples of access control policies to specify
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the restrictions in SoD scenario and AOU scenario. The policy on the left refers
to the SoD scenario: at least two Generals must be present in order to access the
TopSecretDocument. The policy on the right refers to the AOU scenario: the Private
can access the ResctrictedDocument only if no one else is around.

4.4

Threats and Assumptions
We make the following assumptions about the proposed system and the adversary.

Each user, including the adversary, has full access to his/her device. Each device has
been preauthorized by the IT admin for BYOD use. Preauthorization consists of
verifying that (1) the device supports hardware-backed cryptographic key generation
and storage and (2) the device’s sensors, including Bluetooth, accelerometer, and
fngerprint sensors, are functioning correctly. Consequently, we assume IT admins can
be trusted. Each device must generate asymmetric cryptographic keys via Androids
Hardware-Backed Keystore [31], in which the public key for that device is uploaded
to a server for later use while the unexportable private key is stored securely in
hardware. We trust the Android access control system, which includes the Android
middleware and Linux Kernel, to correctly enforce all security policies. Physical
security or video monitoring is employed to prevent the adversary from compromising
proximity modules and entering the environment with foreign objects such as a nonsecured phone. We only consider a passive adversary, and not active adversary. That
is, the adversary has control of the communication channel, but is not able to inject
new packets or compromise transmitted packets. The adversary is only able to relay
packets transmitted between parties. In other words, the attacker posses standard
Dolev-Yao capabilities [79]. We also consider insider threats to the organization. In
particular, malicious employees may attempt to circumvent our context-aware access
system through collusion. Last, we assume each proximity module has access to
the public keys of Client devices, which can be retrieved on demand or during the
installation of the proximity module.
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Fig. 4.3. CASSEC 2.0’s access control framework.

4.5

System Design
In this section, we describe our CASSEC 2.0 platform that securely supports the

SoD scenario and the AOU scenario described in Section 4.1. We adhere to design
goals from the previous work, which include providing a secure, automated, and generalized architecture with responsibilities of each system component clearly defned.
In CASSEC 2.0’s architecture, we assume the least amount of trusted parties as possible. Our context-aware system proactively monitors and collects information about
the environment in lieu of manual intervention by entities within that environment.
Specifcally, we do not rely on users, possibly malicious, to manually report their
location. Therefore, we choose an infrastructure-based approach that uses wireless
hardware to localize occupants within a monitored space. In the rest of the section,
we defne our interpretation of the term proximity and then provide an overview of the
architectural components of CASSEC 2.0 and how they relate to our access control
framework.
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4.5.1

Proximity Zone

We rely on geographical proximity, which indicates that two entities are located
within a certain distance in the physical space [43]. That is, in our work, proximity
of a user is defned by a region of space monitored by a proximity module. The user
must be within the region of space in order to gain access. We refer to this region
of monitored space as a proximity zone. The level of precision in determining the
location of a user and the proximity of other users is application dependent [9, 18].

4.5.2

Components

Access Control
Here we describe the architectural components tasked with enforcing our PrBAC
policies.
Enterprise Content Server (ECS): The ECS, which acts as the Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP), delivers enterprise resources to users who request access. By designing
this component as a server, a heterogeneous network of end-users’ devices can be
serviced. Therefore, access to resources can be requested from desktop terminals or
mobile devices.
Authorization Server (AS): The AS hosts the access control decision-making engine of the authorization framework. After a user has been authenticated by the AS
via login credentials, it returns an authentication token to the Client device. The
token, which is submitted to the ECS by the Client, is used to associate an authenticated user with authorized roles. The AS itself is composed of two sub-components:
Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Information Point (PIP). We discuss in more
detail the construction of the authentication token and AS’s sub-components later in
Section 4.5.3.
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Contextual Information
In order to extract contextual information from the environment, we take both an
active and passive approach. We use the terms active and passive to indicate whether
or not users are required to physically interact with the entity collecting contextual
information. The components involved in contextual information acquisition are as
follows:
Client: A Client is a device used to request access to a resource by a user. If
the request is granted, a user can view the data on the device (e.g., desktop terminal
or mobile smartphone). Unlike their desktop counterparts, smartphone devices allow
mobility with respect to embedded sensors and network connectivity. Consequently,
in our prototype system, we take an active approach to user verifcation via biometric
authentication by utilizing a smartphone as the Client device. That is, the Client
is also designated to verify that the current user of the device is the true owner of
the device. We note that solutions have been developed that take a passive approach
to the collection of biometric features, which may be more secure. If we were to
take a passive approach to biometric authentication, the example policies in Figure
4.2 would also include confdence thresholds under the role specifer since the AS is
designated to evaluate if policies are adhered to. We discuss this further in Section
4.7.
Proximity Module (PM): The role of the PM is to collect and analyze contextual
information in order to detect the proximity of users. This detection process occurs
periodically, and proximity-related information is sent to the AS. Although a PM is
the set of physical devices that determine proximity, we consider them as independent
of the PIP as the PIP is the entity that directly communicates with the PDP. Users
do not physically interact with the PM in our prototype system, and therefore it is
considered passive.
Our architectural components are shown in Figure 4.1. We do not discuss cryptographic schemes to protect network communication between the entities in our system
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model. We assume that an underlying secure network infrastructure is in place, as
usual in enterprise environments. Although the fgure only shows one PM and consequently only one proximity zone, in practice an enterprise building will have multiple
PMs, possibly one for each room.

4.5.3

Access Control Framework

The PDP is the specifc entity that is delegated to make access decisions. It
maintains a database of PrBAC policies. Given these policies, the PDP frst verifes
if someone is a user of the system. The PDP then retrieves the latest information
regarding the user’s location and the presence of other users from the PIP. Such
information allows the PDP to determine the set of authorized geo-spatial roles if
proximity constraints are satisfed. Next, the PDP constructs and returns to the
Client an authentication token. The token, at minimum, contains a generated temporary ID. It may also contain an expiration date. As such, the token is utilized as a
session identifer. Last, the PDP maintains a database mapping of session IDs to the
set of active authorized geo-spatial roles for each user. This mapping is also sent to
the PEP each time a role is authorized.
The PEP’s role, implemented as part of the ECS, is to enforce proximity restrictions for enterprise content. During a request, a Client submits an authentication
token to the ECS. The PEP extracts the temporary session ID from the token. The
PDP continually updates the PEP of mappings of session IDs to a set of active authorized geo-spatial roles. First, the mapping makes it possible to enforce access
restrictions according to the roles associated with that ID. Second, it also enables it
to service multiple Client devices simultaneously. Third, this design anonymizes users
as the PEP does not have any information that identifes users such as locations and
credentials.
The PIP’s role is to store and maintain contextual information about an enterprise’s proximity zones. Each PM, after co-proximity authentication of Clients, is
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required to transmit four pieces of information to the PIP: a proximity zone identifer, the number of people detected, a list of captured UIDs1 and corresponding RSS
values of BLE beacons, and a timestamp. The PIP then records the collected data
into its context database. Instead of the PIP polling the PM for information, we
minimize communication by requiring that the PM updates the AS only when characteristics of the proximity zone changes. In addition, this clear designation of duties
also minimizes overhead in both the PM and AS. Considering the dynamic nature of
the environment, the PIP must update the PDP as frequently as the occurrences of
updates to the context database. Such updates allow the PDP to continuously check
for any instance of proximity-based violations by users. At the time of violation, the
PDP invalidates the relevant session ID mappings by associating existing session IDs
with newly recomputed authorized geo-spatial roles, if any, according to PrBAC policies. The PDP then remotely informs the PEP of invalid mappings while providing
new authorized ones. The PDP can also alert the enterprise’s administrators to take
appropriate action. Such a design makes the system completely automated by only
requiring users to be authenticated once by the AS.

4.5.4

Co-Proximity Authentication

Radio signals permeate through walls, and therefore it is possible that two PMs located in two adjacent rooms may detect the same Client device, even though in reality
the Client is located in one of the rooms. However, such signals exhibit attenuation
as they pass through walls. We leverage this phenomena to determine the likelihood
that a Client is in a given room. In particular, we analyze the RSS values from BLE
beacons to initiate the co-proximity authentication process, which determines that a
legitimate Client is within a specifc proximity zone.
Overview. The protocol to authenticate the user’s co-proximity to a PM consists
of two phases: the initialization phase and the location authentication phase. First,
1

We assume that each user of the system has an identifer unique to that user.
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the initialization phase establishes a temporary session key (SK) securely shared and
only accessible between a PM and a Client. Next, the SK is later used in the location
authentication phase, in which a timed challenge-response protocol is executed. The
crux of authenticating the user’s co-proximity is analyzing the content of the beacon
as well as the measured round trip time. We explain both phases in detail below.
Initialization Phase. The initialization phase is activated once the user enters
2 , that is, the concentric region as indicated by BLE’s Near ranging measurement
(i.e., between 1-3m from the PM as displayed in Figure 4.4). Placing a PM at the
center of an average sized conference room (e.g., ˘6m x 6m) allows the PM to detect
and monitor the movements of any Client device that enters the room. In addition,
positioning in such a way may minimize the overlapping of concentric regions of two
adjacent PMs’ proximity zones. Once the Client enters 2 , the PM generates a temporary SK and encrypts it with the Client’s public key. As stated in Section 4.4,
the public key can be retrieved from the authorization server on demand or during
the installation of the PM. The SK is a one-time pad which consists of a string of
bits generated using a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator.
The encrypted SK (Step 1 in Figure 4.5) is then sent to the Client via the AS on a
secure out-of-band channel, which is then decrypted at the Client using the Client’s
hardware-bound private key. The Client fnalizes the initialization phase by responding with an acknowledgement of message receipt, which is relayed back to the PM.
We note that there are a number of methods to securely exchange temporary session
keys. For example, the PM could purely rely on BLE beacons to transmit the encrypted SK, thereby minimizing communication with the server. However, we did not
choose this mode of transmission because of limited data capacity in BLE beacon’s
advertising data structures [23].
Authentication Phase. The PM will continue to monitor and track the Client’s
movements. The authentication phase is activated once the user enters 1 , that is,
the concentric region as indicated by BLE’s Immediate ranging measurement (i.e., less
than 1m from the PM). At this point, the PM initiates a timed challenge-response
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Fig. 4.4. A Proximity Module’s proximity zone regions.

Fig. 4.5. CASSEC 2.0’s co-proximity authentication protocol.

protocol with the target Client. The PM generates a fresh nonce (string of random
bits), embeds the nonce into a BLE beacon, and transmits the beacon. Upon suc-
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cessful transmission, the PM records the time of transmission and precomputes the
expected response. Upon reception, the Client calculates an XOR value, using the
nonce and the SK as the two inputs. XOR operations are simple and require minimal
CPU cycles to compute as opposed to other widely-used cryptographic schemes with
non-negligible encryption/decryption times [80]. Leveraging XOR operations thus
allows the Client to minimize the time to calculate a response to the challenge, and
subsequently package and transmit the response within a BLE beacon. Upon reception of the Client’s response beacon, the PM calculates the RTT value and verifes
that the precomputed value matches the received value. If the values match and the
RTT is less than or equal to a specifed threshold (RT TT H ), the PM informs the
AS that the specifc Client’s location has been authenticated with 100% confdence,
otherwise the PM and Client must repeat both the initialization and authentication
phases. We discuss how we determined RT TT H in Section 4.7. Both phases must
be repeated since information about the temporary session key that is generated in
the initialization phase is leaked in the authentication phase. An attacker can simply
perform an XOR of the nonce, which was transmitted in cleartext, and the Client’s
response beacon to calculate the session key.
To address circumstances resulting in proximity zones partially overlapping, we
take a binary approach. In the case that multiple PMs detect and authenticate a
Client via BLE beacons simultaneously given that BLE beacons can travel several
meters, for simplicity, we classify a Client to be in one of the corresponding rooms
with 100% confdence only if information sent by a PM meet two conditions: (1) the
RSS value (measured from the beacon) is the strongest of all RSS values detected by
other PMs; (2) the number of people detected and captured UIDs match. Otherwise,
there is 0% confdence in the Client’s location. The left policy in Figure 4.2 provides an example of PrBAC policy that specifes that the entity enforcing the policy
must determine that the General is in fact located in the GeneralsRoom with 100%
confdence to grant access to the TopSecretDocument.
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4.5.5

Biometric Authentication

User verifcation via biometric authentication is isolated to the only active component in our prototype system, that is, the Client. We specifcally develop an Android application that leverages the smartphone’s capabilities to scan fngerprints
and measure acceleration in order to achieve physiological and behavioral biometric
authentication, respectively. User verifcation is abstractly a two phase process (see
Section 4.2): the enrollment and authentication phases. With respect to security,
it is vital that enterprise administrators proctor the enrollment phase in-person to
confrm that biometric measurements taken by a Client device match the true owner
of the device. Fingerprint scanning and the collection of walking traces are achieved
and easily integrated into our application using Android’s Fingerprint Authentication
and Sensor Manager APIs2 . To ensure the privacy of users, the fngerprint and gait
templates constructed during the enrollment phase never leave the device.
We implemented the behavioral component of the user verifcation framework in
a similar fashion as proposed by Ren et al. [76]. The framework consists of three
components, which can be abstracted to the enrollment and authentication phases
previously mentioned: Step Cycle Identifcation, Step Cycle Interpolation, and Similarity Comparison. The components are built on the fact that human gait should
be cyclic in nature, and hence should exhibit high correlation. Here, a step cycle is
the period defned by the two consecutive heel strikes on the same leg (see Figure
4.6(a)). The Step Cycle Identifcation component identifes step cycles in a walking
trace, and then uses the extracted features to construct and store a biometric template. Although smartphone accelerometers provide signals in three dimensions, the
framework extracts only the signals from the vertical direction to identify impacts
caused by heel strikes. Figure 4.6(b) displays a walking trace with identifed cyclical
heel strike impacts. Users usually walk at varying speeds, which would negatively
impact the verifcation process if the template and the runtime measurements are of
2
We do not elaborate on implementation details as Android provides detailed instructions and samples to utilize Android Fingerprint Authentication and acceleration measuring [31].
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 4.6. 4.6(a) is an illustration of a complete gait cycle from the
initial heel strike to the terminal heel strike (from [81]). 4.6(b) displays
preliminary measurements of accelerometer signals of a walking trace
in the vertical direction we collected using a Nexus 6P smartphone.
Orange lines indicate step cycles identifed by heel strike impacts.

traces with di˙erent speeds. Addressing this potential problem, the Step Cycle Interpolation phase enables robust user verifcation by normalizing identifed step cycles of
di˙erent lengths into fxed lengths. Figure 4.7 displays the interpolated accelerometer
signals, recorded using a Nexus 6P, of slow (slower than 0.7 m/s), normal (about 0.7
- 1.1 m/s), and fast (about 1.1 - 1.4 m/s) walking traces to a fxed length of 400
samples. The fgure demonstrates that step cycles are highly correlated regardless of
walking speed. Last, user authentication is performed in the Similarity Comparison
phase, which utilizes a weighted Pearson correlation coeÿcient (PCC) based method.
We apply defense-in-depth within the authentication phase. We frst use Pearson
correlation coeÿcients when computing the similarity between the gait template and
the walking trace runtime measurements. Users are only verifed if similarity scores
are above a predefned threshold (see Section 4.6.4). If similarity scores fall below the
threshold, the user is then required to perform authentication via fngerprint scanner
when the user attempts to access the phone. We are unable to set a threshold for
fngerprint authentication as we rely on the Client device’s integrated fngerprint
solution. If the user neither can be verifed via behavioral nor physiological biometric
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authentication, the Client ensures that sensitive enterprise content is inaccessible by
locking the device3 . In addition, the Client can alert enterprise administrators for
possible user spoofng.

Fig. 4.7. Step cycle interpolation applied to walking traces collected
using our Nexus 6P smartphone at three di˙erent speeds: slow, normal, and fast.

4.6

Prototype Implementation

4.6.1

The ECS

The ECS was implemented in PHP and hosted on a remote commercial server.
The resources that it could serve to Clients were simple text fles. We implemented
user interfaces (UI) in order for Clients to request access to specifc fles. The ECS
provides a function that can be remotely invoked via URL: sessAuth(mappings). The
function is invoked by the AS to update the ECS regarding the active geo-spatial
roles for Clients in the event that location updates refect proximity violations.
3

We build an application on the Client using Android’s Device Administration API, which includes
the device lock ability [31].
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4.6.2

The AS

The AS was also implemented in PHP and hosted on the same server as the ECS.
We implemented the UI in order for Clients to pass in authentication credentials via
a login page. The AS provides two functions that can be remotely invoked via URLs:
auth(user,psswd) and addEntry(pzoneID,numOfPpl, UIDs+RSSs, time). The frst
function is invoked by a Client via the UI and the second is invoked by the PM to
update proximity information within the context database.

4.6.3

The PM

As in any basic positioning system, a PM incorporates a transmitter and a receiver.
We defne a transmitter as a wireless-enabled device that is a source of contextual
information regarding the occupants within a proximity zone. A receiver is a wirelessenabled device that acts as a sink for such contextual information.
We utilize BLE-enabled smartphones and WiFi access points (APs) as transmitters. In regards to smartphones, we embed three values into BLE beacons to support
co-proximity authentication. Generally, these devices periodically broadcast their 48bit Bluetooth MAC addresses with a less than 10 meter range indoors when Bluetooth
is enabled. However, since Android 6.0, the MAC address found in a BLE beacon
is replaced with a random value at various intervals to protect user privacy [31].
User privacy is not a concern within the enterprise scenarios that CASSEC targets.
Disabling this feature would require modifying the Android OS, which reduces the
deployability of our solution. Therefore, we cannot rely on this hardware address to
identify users. Instead, in CASSEC 2.0, we embed a 48-bit UID into BLE’s local name
data structure using Android’s BluetoothAdapter.getDefaultAdapter().setName(UID).
The BLE beacon data protocol is limited with respect to the amount of custom data
we are able to embed within a beacon. As a result, the nonce, as well as the one-time
pad SK generated by the PM, is restricted to 12-bytes. With the remaining space, we
embed a 16-byte service UUID which enables Clients and Proximity Modules to com-
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municate under a beacon service. We require that users of the system permanently
enable their smartphones’ Bluetooth. Such a requirement can be easily enforced by
Enterprise Mobility Management services [20]. WiFi APs transmit data over signals
that can be measured. However, such signals are signifcantly infuenced by the environment. We rely on the interference of signals as a result of human activity to
determine the number of occupants in a proximity zone.
The PM was implemented as two physical devices: a Pixel C tablet running
Android Oreo (API 26 v8.0) and a laptop using Python running Linux. For brevity,
we refer to these devices as simply the PM. The PM was charged with periodically
scanning signals produced by BLE and WiFi devices. Beacon scan settings were
set to SCAN_MODE_LOW_LATENCY from the ScanSettings API, while WiFi
signals were scanned every 10 seconds. The PM extracts the UIDs of beacons from
nearby occupants’ smartphones. The UIDs are used as proof-of-location once coproximity authentication has been established, which determines who is in a given
space. The PM also measures the received signal strength from a designated WiFi
AP. The receiver processes the measured WiFi RSS value and determines how many
occupants are in a given space. Last, the receiver publishes the UIDs, beacon RSS
values, and the number of occupants to the authorization server only when previously
collected contextual information changes.
We note that the various components of the CASSEC 2.0’s system architecture
can be integrated into the same physical component when implemented. For example,
a smartphone mobile device can act both as Client and transmitter because the
same device used to request access to a resource is the same device that periodically
broadcasts its Bluetooth data structures. Similarly, a desktop terminal can act both
as Client and receiver because it can also be used to scan and process WiFi and
Bluetooth contextual information.
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4.6.4

Use Case

In this section, we evaluate features of the CASSEC 2.0 prototype system in
order to provide clear insights into addressing the issues raised in Section 4.1. We
measure the performance of the system’s biometric and co-proximity authentication
components to prove the feasibility of securing enterprise content under a proximitybased access control model.

Deployment
We deployed our hardware and tested our prototype system in a two bedroom
apartment whose layout is shown in Figure 4.8. We now briefy describe the hardware
utilized in our platform.
The Wireless-N (802.11n) WiFi AP transmitter was a Motorola SURFBoard
SBG6580, indicated in blue, that supports two frequency bands which are 2.5GHz
and 5.0GHz. We chose the higher-frequency band to take advantage of additional
channels that are less prone to interference than 2.4GHz. The receiver was a Dell
Latitude E6430, indicated in green, equipped with a BCM4313 802.11bgn wireless
network adapter and a Dell Wireless 380 Bluetooth 4.0. The transmitter and the
receiver were placed 3 meters apart and were elevated 1 meter above the foor. The
Bluetooth-enabled transmitters used in our study were Samsung S3 GT-i9300 and
Nexus 6P. The Nexus 6P, which has a fngerprint scanner and an accelerometer that
supports a 200Hz sampling rate, was used for biometric collection and analysis.

Use Case Evaluations
Evaluation 1: Selecting Frequency Channel. Given a wireless link between
a transmitter and a receiver, an individual crossing the line of sight between the two
communicating wireless sensors a˙ects the RSS measured by the receiver. However,
the change in RSS depends on the frequency channel [9]. Our goal is to determine
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Fig. 4.8. The blueprint of a two-bedroom apartment in which the
prototype system had been deployed. The blue markers and green
markers indicate the positions of WiFi access points and laptops, respectively. The dotted lines indicate the two possible positions for
each human, and transitions simply require moving two steps without changing body orientation. The red dots represent the current
positions of the humans standing still while facing the laptop.

which channel is the best for detecting human activity based on our particular WiFienabled devices. We test 2 non-overlapping 40MHz channels: Channel A (5180MHz)
and Channel B (5220MHz). The experimental setup is as follows. Throughout the
complete test, we continuously measure the RSS value sampling twice per second.
Every 30 seconds we change the number of individuals obstructing the LOS by 1
starting from zero to two, and then in a decreasing fashion. The occupants were
situated equidistant from each receiver. A Python script was written to automatically
begin the test. The tests were conducted in Bedroom 1.
The results in Figure 4.9 demonstrate that there is no signifcant di˙erence in
measurement variation in human-induced interference in RSS signals between Channel A and Channel B. At frst, Channel A appears to be more consistent as the level
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Fig. 4.9. RSS measurements of wireless links on di˙erent frequency
bands when human bodies obstruct the line of sight (LOS). The blue
circles indicate the number of humans in the LOS within each 60sample period (i.e., every 30 seconds).

of signal interference in samples 60 - 120 aligns with values in samples 180 - 240 when
the number of individuals increases from zero to one and two to one, respectively.
This is not observed in Channel B during that period. However, the values for Channel A appear to indicate the presence of a number of individuals di˙erent from the
number of individuals actually present from samples 330 onward. This fuctuation
is not observed in Channel B. Although Figure 4.9 shows the results of only one
complete test, we performed this test 3 times and observed similar changes in values.
Given these observations, we select Channel B as a means for testing in the rest of
the study.
We also make some general observations about human-induced RSS changes. We
observed distinct variances in signal strength almost every 30 seconds (multiple of
60 units in Figure 4.9). First, by initiating the test with no individuals obstructing
the LOS, we were able to establish a baseline for the signal strength between the
transmitter and receiver. The RSS value remained always constant within that time
period up until to two seconds after the 30 second mark. That is, using our existing
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hardware, we were able to determine that once we increase the number of individuals
by one, the individuals must remain in the LOS for at least one second for the receiver
to observe some interference from human activity. Such phenomena was also observed
at the beginning or end of each period. Second, regardless of the selected channel,
when the LOS is obstructed by an individual the RSS on average decreases. In
addition, distinct dBm drop ranges exist depending on the number of individuals.
Therefore we can infer the presence or absence of humans based on RSS’ ranges. For
example, in Channel A, we consistently observed a drop range of 6-8 dBm between
30-60, 90-120, 150-180, and 210-240 seconds. We note that our observations are likely
to change using di˙erent WiFi-enabled hardware.
Evaluation 2: WiFi Detection Accuracy. The goal here is to test the WiFi
localization component of our PM. Specifcally, we implemented a simple algorithm
to detect the number of people within the LOS based on our observations of humaninduced RSS changes from Evaluation 1. The setup to this test is similar to the setup
for Evaluation 1, except that we perform the test in both Bedrooms 1 and 2. We
conduct the test on Channel B.
Table 4.2 displays the results. The system was able to detect with strong accuracy
(89%) the number of occupants obstructing the line of sight in Bedroom 1. At certain
points, sporadic fuctuations occurred that caused the system to return an incorrect
number. On the other hand, the system was only able to detect occupancy with
43% accuracy in Bedroom 2. After further analysis (by performing Evaluation 1 in
Bedroom 2), we observed the human-induced interference was slightly di˙erent in RSS
levels. Although the physical layouts of Bedroom 1 and 2 are identical, there may be
other (unseen) environmental factors that also infuenced the RSS levels to slightly
di˙er between the two rooms. For example, such factors may include overlapping
wireless networks (possibly using the same channel) from neighboring apartments,
appliances and electronics emitting radio frequency interference, and simply walls
and foors blocking wireless signals in di˙erent ways depending on the location of
access points [71].
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Table 4.2.
WiFi detection accuracy.
Location

Detection

Bedroom1

89%

Bedroom2

43%

Evaluation 3: Gait Recognition Detection Latency. The goal here is to
determine the required length of a walking trace to identify the true owner of a Client
device using gait recognition. CASSEC was developed with certain enterprises in
mind that desire high assurances that sensitive enterprise content on end-users’ devices is well protected. We therefore set the pre-defned threshold to 0.8. A single
user participated in this study using a Nexus 6P smartphone device to record and
analyze accelerometer values. In order to execute the test, the user performed the
enrollment and authentication phases. We frst collected from the user six 60-second
walking traces at normal speed: the frst and subsequent fve traces to be used for
gait template construction and runtime measurements in the enrollment and authentication phases, respectively. Then, in the enrollment phase, n, n = 5, 6, ...60, gait
templates were constructed for the user which were derived from extracting n seconds
from the frst trace. Next, in the authentication phase, we extracted n seconds from
each of the subsequent traces to analyze and compare biometric templates with runtime measurements that are of corresponding lengths. In its entirety, we repeated
this test twice; di˙erentiating the two by placement of the smartphone device: on the
hip and within the pocket.
Figure 4.10 displays the results of the test. We frst note that all similarity scores
produced were at least greater or equal to the predefned threshold. On average, the
system was able to detect that the current user of the Client device is the true owner
with approximately 91% and 89% confdence (i.e., similarity score) when the phone is
placed on the hip and within the pocket, respectively. The system only required fve
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seconds of each walking trace to make such an assertion. We also observe that longer
traces eventually produce higher levels of confdence in identifying the true owner
because more gait features were extracted, and therefore more identifying features
can be determined during the authentication phase.

Fig. 4.10. Average similarity score by varying the duration of user
profle trace and runtime measurement trace.

Extracting more gait features over a longer period of time produces higher levels
of confdence while in the pocket as compared to on the hip. Upon further analysis
of individual traces from both the hip and pocket, it appears that hip traces have
increased oscillations that are not quite periodic. Particularly, we observed that there
are more variations in-between the heel strikes as compared to pocket traces. First,
the Step Cycle Identifcation component may falsely identify when the user’s leg comes
in contact with the ground if oscillations closely resembles heel strikes. Second, the
gait recognition program assumes a cyclic nature, and thus if no repetition occurs
within these sporadic oscillations, correct heel strikes, which occur outside of the
oscillations, may not be properly analyzed as well. It is evident that the hip is
continuously gyrating, and therefore, has a periodic motion. However, we believe
that the increased (and erroneous) variations are the result of the method in which
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we attached the device to the hip. While the device is securely fastened and fushed
with the hip clip in order to minimize erroneous movement of the device, it is diÿcult
to replicate such a secure grip with the hip clip itself as it is attached to the wearer’s
clothing. However, while placed in the pocket, the device is resistant to minor shu˜ing
because it is pressed against the user’s clothing and leg. Nevertheless, the results of
this test demonstrate that feasibility to detect the true owner of the Client device
with high confdence when placed within the pocket or attached to the hip, even
considering the inherent erroneous data that is acquired while the device is attached
to the hip.
As stated in Section 4.2, the development of gait recognition techniques for user
verifcation is outside the scope of this work. We emphasize that this work is a
feasibility study that demonstrates the application of biometric techniques such as
gait authentication to securing enterprise content under a proximity-based access
control model solely using one mobile device. We refer readers to the work by Ren et
al. [76] for an extensive user evaluation of the gait authentication technique we have
leveraged.
Evaluation 4: Robustness Against Di˙erent Walking Speeds. The goal
here is to test the robustness of the system against various walking speeds. We
applied the same methodology as Evaluation 3 with an exception. We also compare
the biometric template constructed from the normal walking trace to fve runtime
measurements collected from the user for both slow and fast walking speeds.
Figure 4.11 displays the results of the test. Similarity score calculations derived
from the normal and fast walking traces were at least greater or equal to the predefned
threshold of 0.8. However, in a few instances, our system was unable to authenticate
the current user as the true owner of the device. 07% of the similarity scores calculated, which we consider negligible, fell within the range of [0.7,0.8). Nevertheless,
we can observe in any walking trace, including the slow walking trace, that there is
a positive correlation between the trace length and the similarity scores produced.
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Fig. 4.11. Average similarity score calculated by comparing the normal walking biometric template with both the slow and fast runtime
measurement walking traces.

That is, the system can reliably determine the user with increasing confdence over a
longer period of time.
Evaluation 5: Capturing BLE Beacon RTT Values. One type of distancebounding technique uses the elapsed time between two devices for distance estimation.
Our goal for this test is to apply such a technique to BLE and determine if indeed
that the round trip time of beacons is a function of distance. We exchanged beacons
between two BLE-capable devices (Pixel C tablet and Nexus 6P smartphone) and
recorded 100 RTT values at various distances. The devices were laid down across a
wooden desk with the front screen facing upwards. Figure 4.12 shows the distribution
of RTT values measured between the two devices. We note that displayed values
refect distance estimation as implemented in our co-proximity authentication. We
frst observed that most of the RTT values, at each distance, are centered around the
median (the black line within the inner quartile range). For example, at distances of
1ft, 4ft, and 6ft, the RTT values are centered around approximately 81ms (± 1ms),
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while at a distance of 2ft, RTT values are centered around 77ms. We also observed
that the IQR, the box that spans the frst and third quartiles, are centered in between
72ms and 86ms. Consequently, no signifcant statistical variations of RTT values exist
when the PM and the Client device executed the timed challenge-response protocol
at distances between 1-6ft. Moreover, we produced similar results when we applied
the same experimental process, but instead separated the devices with a 1ft wall. We
discuss the security implications in Section 4.7.

Fig. 4.12. Distribution of round trip time of 100 Bluetooth Low Energy beacons each at various distances, exchanged between a Proximity Module and a Client.

4.7

Security Analysis
In this section, we present a security analysis of our CASSEC 2.0 platform to

analyze attacks aiming at circumventing its PrBAC restrictions. Below, we provide
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various attack vectors that could be used and, subsequently, a means to mitigate the
threat or minimize the attack vector surface.

4.7.1

Bluetooth Manipulation

In our previous work, when a PM publishes a MAC address to the PIP, it attests
that a specifc individual is at a specifc proximity zone. A malicious user may attempt
to root his/her device and modify the MAC address in order to impersonate another
user of the system. In CASSEC 2.0, however, such malicious modifcation of MAC
addresses would do no harm for two reasons: (1) we rely on UIDs that are dynamically
embedded into data structures within BLE beacons; and (2) Android Oreo (API 26
v8.0) automatically randomizes the MAC addresses of beacons. Moreover, an attacker
that roots his device to dynamically alter beacon UIDs (through a modifed and
unauthorized custom OS) to impersonate a legitimate user would fail the challengeresponse protocol for several reasons including the attacker’s inability to access the
legitimate user’s private key, which is bound to the user’s Client device hardware (i.e.,
not exportable). In addition, Samsung has demonstrated via Samsung KNOX 2.0, a
custom Android OS intended for enterprise environments [20], hardware and software
security features that leave the device inoperable once it detects a root attack, which
is a suÿcient mechanism to defend against malicious modifcation of the OS.
One attack that malicious users may attempt is masking their smartphones’ Bluetooth peripheral services by either disabling the Bluetooth or simply leaving the
device in another room. Although we require that Bluetooth be permanently enabled
on users’ devices, we do not incorporate an enforcement mechanism within the phone
to meet such requirement. However, our system is able to detect if the violation of
such requirement occurs. The WiFi localization technique is able to determine the
number of occupants in the room. If the number of occupants and the number of
UIDs, which are published to the PIP, for a given room do not match, the PDP will
infer such malicious behaviour and subsequently revoke access to resources. In ad-
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dition, appropriate actions can be taken by the system administrator. We also note
that Android provides Device Administrator APIs for BYOD scenarios, which allow
enterprises to take control of sensitive resources and modify system confgurations on
their employees’ devices. Through such APIs, an enterprise can then permanently
enable Bluetooth services.
Another attack vector involves an unauthorized individual obtaining an authorized user’s phone, whether by theft or voluntary provision. If such an attack occurs,
then the unauthorized individual can gain access to restricted resources. In reality,
this sort of attack exploits social engineering and/or insider threats that are usually
already covered as part of an enterprise’s global security e˙orts. Nevertheless, in our
extended system, we mitigate this previously unaddressed attack vector by incorporating mechanisms that are able to determine biometric signatures for every user in
the system. In particular, we employ behavioral (i.e., dynamic gait analysis) and
physiological (i.e., fngerprint analysis) biometric authentication, which ensures that
unauthorized users will not be able to bypass security by using someone else’s device.
One of the objectives of this work is to address context monitoring issues including
adversarial context manipulation via passive attacks (e.g., malicious relay of BLE
beacons). However, we emphasize that if we relax assumptions stated in Section
4.4 and elevate the adversary’s capabilities to active attacks, we envision two active
attack vectors the adversary could employ that would not circumvent the security of
the system: packet injection and Denial-of-Service (DoS). An astute active attacker
would determine that an advantage cannot be gained by injecting packets at either
Step 3 or Step 4 of the co-proximity authentication protocol (Figure 4.5). Intercepting
the BLE beacon that encapsulates nonce at Step 3 and transmitting a new malicious
beacon that encapsulates a nonce’, which would be now received by the Client, is
unnecessary. The original nonce is transmitted in cleartext, thereby allowing the
adversary to simply record the observed value, which may be potentially used in Step
4. However, the attacker again would not need to inject packets in Step 4 since the
attacker has acquired the information needed (i.e., nonce) to extract and calculate the
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temporary session key (SK) from the BLE beacon sent by the Client. Knowledge of
nonce and SK also does not violate the security of the system (see Section 4.5.4). In
summary, injecting attacker-generated BLE beacons would serve no purpose towards
the goal of fooling the CASSEC 2.0 system into establishing co-proximity between
the PM and the Client.
Given that intercepting and subsequently injecting malicious BLE beacons between the PM and the Client would serve no purpose towards circumventing coproximity authentication, an active attacker may instead rely on DoS attacks. A
malicious user may attempt a DoS attack by acquiring a high-powered Bluetoothenabled device [82–84]. Specifcally, the user frst adjusts the special device to mimic
his original (or another user’s) smartphone’s UID, and then boosts the signal strength.
As a consequence, receivers in di˙erent rooms within a certain radius may incorrectly
publish the proof-of-location. Therefore, the PDP will believe that multiple violations are occurring. First, the system is inherently resistant to such attack. Because
of signal attenuation, proximity modules, which have lower transmission capabilities
than of the adversary’s high-powered device, may not be able to transmit the challenge beacon to the malicious device, which may be potentially far from the proximity
module. However, if reception of the challenge does occur, several methods could be
employed to counteract this attack. For example, our study shows that the majority
of beacon RTT values fell between 72ms and 86ms. The PM could invalidate the
challenge, thereby invalidating the corresponding response, after 86ms has elapsed.
We emphasize that we are describing this DoS attack under the assumption that
the attacker is able to somehow relay the temporary session key (once it has been
decrypted) from his Client to the special device, otherwise the objective of the DoS
attack would be to simply waste computing resources by repeatedly initiating the
co-proximity authentication process.
The results in Section 4.6.4 demonstrated that no signifcant statistical variations of RTT values exist when the PM and the Client device executed co-proximity
authentication at distances between 1-6ft. Consequently, time-based distance esti-
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mation techniques that rely on BLE beacons as its underlying technology are not
reliable methods for di˙erentiating between adjacent proximity zones within an enterprise environment. However, such techniques may be resistant to an adversary’s
attempts to execute relay attacks when the Client is far away, that is, outside the
enterprise environment. Let us assume the adversary’s attack takes the form of a
ghost-and-leech attack vector [85] in which the adversary employs two relay devices
( APM , AC ) that are each within 6ft of the PM and the Client, respectively, and the
two malicious devices communicate over a high-speed connection. Let us also assume
that APM and AC have similar hardware and software to that of the Client and PM,
respectively. The total RTT (RT TT ) is the sum of the RTT values between the PM
and APM (RT TP M ), APM and AC (RT TP M C ), which consists of RTT values between the network communication nodes that support the high speed connection, and
AC and the Client (RT TC ). The communication relationship between said entities is
visually depicted as:
P M — APM · · · AC — Client

RT TT = RT TP M + RT TP M C + RT TC
It is diÿcult to approximate RT TP M and RT TP M C because their values are signifcantly infuenced by and dependent on many factors (e.g., communication nodes’
connection medium, network traÿc load, propagation delay, etc.). However, since the
beacon transmission between AC and Client simulates the transmission between the
PM and the Client as consequence of employing similar hardware and software, we
are able to approximate RT TC to 81ms based on our study. In addition, the triangle
inequality theorem ensures us that RT TP M + RT TP M C > RT TC since the path from
the PM to the Client is not a direct route. Thus, the RTT threshold (RT TT H ) should
be set to 81ms for each legitimate proximity module to prevent relay attacks when
the Client is outside the enterprise environment.

85
4.7.2

WiFi Manipulation

We leverage the WiFi signal interference caused by human activity to determine
the number of occupants in a given room. A malicious user could attempt a DoS
by disrupting WiFi signals. That is, an attacker could acquire a special device that
would, for example, completely nullify WiFi signals [82–84]. Another means to circumvent the system would be to obstruct the LOS with something other than a
human body such as a chair. Therefore, in either case, when the receiver processes
the signal interference, it may publish an incorrect number of users within that room.
However, the authorization server will detect violations because inconsistencies will
exist within the PIP.
Regardless of whether Bluetooth or WiFi manipulation is employed, the scenarios
that we address make it more diÿcult to circumvent CASSEC 2.0. That is, in both
the SoD Scenario and the AOU scenario, multiple users with mutual interests must
collude and agree in order to attempt bypassing the system.

4.7.3

True Continuous Authentication

Our passive biometric authentication scheme only provides continuous authentication while the Client smartphone device is within the user’s pocket. It is possible that
an authorized user, whom the Client had previously authenticated, simply removes
the device from the pocket, and subsequently gives the device to an unauthorized user.
Consequently, the device is unlocked and its content is accessible by the unauthorized
user. Therefore, other biometric authentication must be used. While there are both
active and passive biometric authentication solutions, passive solutions should be
used to maximize usability as they would not require users to actively authenticate
themselves. To protect against such an attack, other passive biometric techniques to
continually authenticate while the user is holding the phone should be used. Some
biometric features that could be analyzed and passively authenticated include timing
of keystrokes, touchscreen behavior, face, retina, or iris [74,86,87]. In fact, passive fa-
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cial recognition technology has been recently (Nov, 2017) integrated into the Apple’s
new fagship mobile device: iPhone X [88].

4.8

Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose a proximity-based context-aware access control mech-

anism that also incorporates constraints concerning the confdence about user and
location information. Such constraints allow the system to make decisions based
on the degree of reliability of extracted contextual information. We have integrated
such mechanisms into CASSEC 2.0 and have conducted a feasibility study to show
our approach is viable in practice. We have evaluated our confdence constructs and
collected some data by implementing behavioral and physiological biometric authentication and extending the occupancy detection mechanism with a robust co-proximity
authentication protocol that is resistant against relay attacks. However, occupants
were required to stand in the line of sight for at least one second to detect human
activity and subsequently the number of occupants within a room. CASSEC 2.0
also implicitly assumes that remote enterprise content is only accessible online and is
never stored on the end-user’s device. In order to continue productivity, the end-user
may need to download enterprise content to the device. Therefore, an enforcement
mechanism must exist on the end-user’s device to secure the content. We address
these concerns in the next chapter. We investigate other localization techniques with
higher accuracy and more robust detection. In addition, we investigate client-side
technology to isolate enterprise content from all other device content and enforce
proximity-based access control policies on enterprise content.
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5. A CONTEXT-BASED CONTAINERIZATION SYSTEM
Platform-level EMM systems enable enterprises to deploy and manage containers,
which contain sensitive enterprise content, to end-users’ devices. However, we argue that given the dynamic nature of EED scenarios as users are assumed to be
mobile, EMM systems must also consider the context in which containers (i.e., personas) are employed. In this chapter, we present the design of our Context-Based,
Multi-Enterprise Containerization (MERC) context-aware system (CAS) that utilizes
our prototype PBS to infuence the behavior of containers. The MERC architecture
limits employees’ accesses to work personas and enterprise content within them dynamically and passively through the enforcement of context-based constraints. The
novelty of our system is twofold. First, our system is the frst to apply both locationand proximity-based (hereinafter, context/ual) constraints to containers. Second, we
utilize sound to determine a device’s logical location. We observe that many proposed PBSs are radio-based, and objects of various size, shape, and material in the
environment can obstruct the propagation path of radio signals, thus diminishing the
accuracy. For example, the work by Bocca et al. [9] demonstrates the e˙ect of human
interference on the propagation path of radio signals. Instead, we leverage the unique
characteristics of sound that make it suitable for supporting PBSs. First, unlike radio
signals, sound is inherently localized as it cannot penetrate walls or propagate over
long distances. Second, it does not require a line-of-sight, as with GNSS systems
whose signal degrades if a device is within a building. Third, the audio frequency of
sound can be shifted so that it is inaudible to the human ear (i.e., ultrasound). To
detect the proximity of other users, we also leverage Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
capabilities of mobile devices as standardized BLE protocols provide proximity ranging measurements. We implemented our custom Android operating system (OS),
MERCOS, on Pixel C and Nexus 6P, which OEMs can readily incorporate into their

88
proprietary EMMs (e.g., Samsung KNOX [20]). Enterprises can also readily deploy
our custom PBS using devices with microphones, speakers, and Bluetooth pervaded
in existing mobile IT and building infrastructures [89]. Last, we extend Android
Device Administration policies with proximity-based constraints to infuence persona
behavior.
The contributions of this chapter can be summarized as followed:
1. Position-Based Containerization: We propose a context-based containerization
policy enforcement scheme to control EED devices based upon positional constraints. Di˙erent from existing containerization architectures, our approach is
the frst to introduce proximity-based constraints to Android containers.
2. Position-Based Service: We investigate the feasibility of a novel application of
ultrasound to determine a user’s location. We also evaluate proximity-based
detection via BLE. Our results produced high accuracy, with 100% location detection accuracy and a maximum false negative rate of 4% in proximity detection
accuracy while introducing a minor impact on battery life, thus demonstrating
the feasibility and e˙ectiveness of our solution.
3. Secure Beacon Protocol: We propose an acoustic-based protocol that addresses
several signifcant challenges in supporting a multi-enterprise position-based
architecture, including interoperability, privacy, and security.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 introduces motivational positionbased scenarios. We provide additional background information on PBSs in Section
5.2. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 introduce our approach followed by the implementation and
technical details in Section 5.5. We next report our experimental results in Section
5.6. We analyze the security of our approach in Section 5.7. Section 5.8 concludes
the chapter.
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5.1

Motivating Scenarios
The MERC specifcally targets enterprises that are currently using EMM systems

to manage employees’ devices, but require that such systems be context-aware. In
terms of access control, such systems aim to secure access to sensitive content on
employees’ devices by adapting access authorizations to the current context without
explicit user intervention. Below, we describe two scenarios motivating the need to
incorporate context-aware capabilities within EMM systems.
Consider an enterprise setting in which two, but independent enterprise organizations exist. Each enterprise allows enterprise containers, containing sensitive content,
to exist on employees’ devices. Each employee, regardless of the enterprise, is assigned
a role that refects the privileges granted to that employee within the respective organization. NekSec, the frst enterprise, is a network security consulting agency whose
objective is to identify security vulnerabilities within a client’s computer network infrastructure. Banker, the second enterprise, is a fnancial institution that provides
online banking facilities to its customers. Two relevant roles within NekSec and
Banker are (network) Supervisor and Consultant. With respect to accessing enterprise content, the role Supervisor grants an employee many privileges. The privileges
assigned to the Consultant role vary depending on whether the consultant is an external or internal entity to the organization. However, we focus on the former in our
paper, which is further discussed below.
Location-based Containerization Scenario. An enterprise container belonging to NekSec is deployed to Alice’s, a NekSec Consultant, smartphone. The container’s content is highly sensitive as it contains confdential information regarding
NekSec’s clients. The enterprise requires that the container must only be accessible
on NekSec’s campus.
The scenario refects a real world circumstance in which an employee only has access to resources while the employee is on premise. For example, an employee would
normally only be able to access his/her enterprise user account via stationary ter-
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minals; the terminals do not leave the work premise. However, implications of EED
must be considered. The dual use of mobile devices allows employees to remotely
access resources that otherwise would not be accessible outside of the enterprise setting. Therefore, such circumstances require that containers (e.g., user accounts or
personas) must only be accessible at specifc locations.
Proximity-based Containerization Scenario. Banker’s network Supervisor
has hired Alice to investigate the possible existence of insider threats and the leakage of
confdential fnancial information through the institution’s network-enabled computing
devices. Similarly, to conduct her investigation, a Banker container with confdential network security data has been deployed to Alice’s smartphone, but can only be
accessed within a designated oÿce on Banker’s campus. In addition, only employees
with the role of Supervisor or higher are authorized to be within Alice’s immediate
proximity while in the oÿce.
This scenario also refects real world circumstances; in fact, 23% of enterprises make
EED available to contractors [19]. Consultants are often hired to temporarily provide their expertise on an on-going project, but are only granted a limited set of
privileges required to execute their duties. In addition, investigating the existence
of nefarious activities executed by employees is of a sensitive nature; Banker should
be extremely cautious not to alert low level employees that are concluded to have
malicious intent. Consequently, such circumstances require that containers must only
be accessible depending on proximity-based information.

5.2

Background
Besides BLE (Chapter 2), acoustic communication is also a possible technology for

both geofencing and microlocation PBSs [90, 91]. By applying coding schemes, data
can be transmitted and received through the air using acoustic hardware in mobile
devices. Various coding schemes (e.g., on-o˙ keying) have been proposed that encode
data into sound by modulating sound wave properties, such as frequency, amplitude,
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or phase which a˙ect the bit rate, bit error rate, and range of transmission [90, 91].
As our work targets EED scenarios, we are particularly interested in encoding mechanisms that allow reliable acoustic communication using audio signals not perceivable
to humans. That is, we embed location-based information in ultrasonic signals that
operate at frequencies above 18 kHz, which is understood to be frequencies at which
adult humans are unable to detect. Developing or determining the optimal encoding
scheme that allows eÿcient transmission of ultrasonic signals is outside the scope
of the paper. We utilize a third-party sound-based, data communication SDK [92]
to embed and extract location information within ultrasonic signals. With such a
SDK, we are able to transmit data at the speed of sound, which is approximately 340
m/s [26] at standard temperature and pressure.

5.3

Design Goals, Challenges, and Assumptions
The design of a multi-enterprise CAS that utilizes a PBS to infuence the behavior

of containers introduces several challenges:
Interoperability: We consider the dynamic nature of users in EED scenarios
involving individuals using their devices for multiple enterprises. The CAS must
therefore address the occupancy detection problem [18], that is, who is and/or how
many people are in a given space. As such, we aim to make our position-based
architecture and secure beacon protocol interoperable so to allow a device’s secure
container to be infuenced even when the device owner moves from one enterprise
environment to another.
Privacy: Another design goal is to ensure the confdentiality of enterprise building infrastructures. Some PBSs (e.g., iBeacons) transmit cleartext positional data,
thereby divulging information particular to a given enterprise. Our system protects
such information as enterprises may desire confdentiality.
Security: One design goal is to minimize the trust placed in users of the system.
Specifcally, we do not rely on users, possibly malicious, to manually report their
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location or proximity to others. Instead, the system takes a proactive approach by
automatically monitoring entities within the environment. In that way, we make
access to personas secure and as fuid as possible.
Ease of Integration: Another design goal is to maximize ease of integration
into enterprises’ IT infrastructures. First, we must consider the method in which
we incorporate context-based constraints into existing OEMs’ containerization solutions. Second, we intentionally employ sensor technology already integrated into IT
infrastructures, thereby removing deployment costs.
Flexibility: As each enterprise environment is unique, we also aim to make the
specifcation of locations as fexible as possible.
Performance: Given that users are assumed to be mobile, continuity of access
must be considered; CASs should be readily updated when context changes. For
instance, a persona should be quickly activated/deactivated once an employee enters/leaves the workplace. As such, we aim to minimize and simplify the steps in the
communication process between the architectural components while not impacting
system performance.

5.3.1

Assumptions

We make the following assumptions about the proposed system and the adversary
attempting to view content (i.e., information regarding the current investigation) on
Alice’s device. Each employee/contractor, including the adversary, has full access to
his/her device. Each device has been preauthorized by the IT admin for EED use.
Preauthorization consists of (1) deploying a work persona to the device in which the
IT admin controls and (2) verifying that the device’s acoustic and Bluetooth sensors
are functioning correctly. Consequently, we assume IT admins can be trusted. We
trust the Android access control system, which includes the Android middleware
and Linux Kernel, to correctly enforce all security policies. Our ultrasonic beacon
protocol requires the exchange of cryptographic keying material between MERC’s
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architectural components to protect communication. We assume that such material
is secured. Physical security or video monitoring is employed to prevent the adversary
from compromising positioning modules and entering the environment with foreign
objects such as a non-secured phone/camera so as to confgure a remote monitoring
device within Alice’s designated oÿce room.

5.4

MERC System Architecture
In this section, we describe the MERC architecture. We frst describe the archi-

tectural components for the sake of defning terms. Next, we provide an overview of
the system.

5.4.1

Client-Server Architecture

Client: A Client is a device that is operated by a user to access enterprise content,
and in our work, content includes persona, applications, and data. We focus on
smartphones, but the same techniques are also applicable to desktops.
Enterprise Policy Server (EPS): The EPS component hosts policies and disseminates them to employees’ devices when required. By designing this component as
a server, a heterogeneous network of end-users’ devices can be serviced. Therefore,
access to resources can be requested from desktop terminals or mobile devices.
Positioning Module (PM): The role of the PM is to detect the positions (i.e.,
location and proximity) of Clients by periodically collecting and analyzing contextual
information.
We note that the various components of MERC’s architecture may not be integrated into the same physical component. In our proof-of-concept implementation,
for example, the PM only provides location verifcation support by transmitting periodic ultrasonic beacons, which Clients consume. In addition, a Client consumes/emits
BLE beacons to determine the proximity of other Clients. We depict the prototype’s
architecture in Figure 5.1.
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Fig. 5.1. Processing of beacons within MERC’s architecture.

5.4.2

Overview

The operations of the MERC are centered around enterprises’ mobile IT management. Each enterprise has enterprise members that deploy personas. We defne an
enterprise member as the entity which deploys, controls, and manages a persona. An
enterprise member could be either the IT admin (of a business/corporation) or simply
an end-user; we, however, focus only on the duties of the former because enterprises
desire to have full control over employees’ personas.
Client Registration. Each enterprise has an Enterprise ID (EID)1 that is communicated to Clients. This EID serves two purposes: (1) as an unique identifer for
an enterprise; (2) as information regarding the top-level locations that belong to the
particular enterprise.
Persona Deployment. We leverage Android facilities to deploy personas on
our platform. The persona deployment is achieved through the development of a
custom device admin application built using Android’s Device Administration APIs.
Use of such APIs increases the MERCOS’s ease of adoption as current IT admins
1

The creation and management of unique EIDs are neither delegated to MERCOS or enterprises.
AFW, through Google Enterprise solutions, handles such operations [93].
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would have already built a device admin to control their employees’ devices running
AFW, which MERCOS is built upon. Once the device admin is downloaded to an
employee’s device, the device admin creates a new persona dedicated to work-related
activities. At this point, a clean userspace containing the same list of applications as
the default persona, including the device admin, will be instantiated. However, unlike
the rest, the device admin is the only application that is removed completely from
the default persona as its duties only lie in the created persona. Once the personacreation process is completed, the device admin must register a legitimate EID, acting
as a persona ID, via our custom interface.
Activating Personas & Deploying Policies. End-users authenticate their
logical location by passively consuming, via Clients, an ultrasonic beacon that is partially encrypted with two di˙erent keys. The Ultrasonic Beacon (Figure 5.1) contains
several pieces of information, including an EID, a Location ID (LID), timestamps,
and a policy number. The ultrasonic beacons are periodically sent every 10 seconds
by a PM. The EID and LID describe a Client’s general (e.g., NekSec’s campus) and
specifc (building 10, room 100) location, respectively.
We apply defense-in-depth by employing three layers of defense to access content
on the Client. First, the Client extracts the EID from the beacon, and compares the
identifer with previously registered EIDs. If there is a matching EID, the Client activates the associated persona, otherwise, the default persona is activated. We use the
term "activate" to simply indicate that a persona is brought to the foreground, and
thus, all other personas are not visible since they execute in the background. Unlike
the frst defense layer, the second and third layers are handled by the device admin.
Android delegates the responsibility of screen-locking a persona to the device admin [31]. However, the device admin allows the screen lock to receive user input only
if the policy number is decipherable. Such defense-in-depth ensures legitimate access authorizations, regardless of an attacker attempting a replay or denial-of-service
attack (see Section 5.7).
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At this point, the Client forwards the beacon’s LID to the device admin, which
is within the Client’s active persona. As the device admin is built by the enterprise,
it is aware of the EPS’ remote address, and thus forwards the LID to the EPS for
processing (requestMapping in Figure 5.1). The content of the LID dictates the
content of the EPS’ response message. Each LID is tied to a unique policy, and
this association is confgured by the enterprise member. The EPS responds with the
policy number and the policy itself.
To minimize communication between the Client and the EPS, the device admin
stores the policy number sent by the EPS. Whenever the device admin extracts a
policy number from the ultrasonic beacon, the device admin compares it with previously stored values. If a value previously exists, the matching policy is adhered to,
otherwise, the device admin forwards the LID to the EPS to retrieve the appropriate
policy.
Encryption Keys. As previously stated, ultrasonic beacons are partially encrypted using two keys (Figure 5.1): Key1 is a periodically updated symmetric key
generated by and stored on the EPS. It is used to encrypt a LID and a timestamp.
Such encryption ensures the confdentiality of an enterprise’s building infrastructure
as per our design goal. Key2 is the private key component of an asymmetric pair
generated by the EPS. The private key is used to encrypt a policy number and a
timestamp. The public component, which is stored within an X.509 certifcate downloaded to a Client device, is used for decryption. Such encryption minimizes the
communication between the Client and EPS while maintaining high security since
the policy number is used to apply an associated policy previously downloaded to the
Client, and therefore obviating the need to contact the EPS as frequently as ultrasonic
beacons are broadcasted.
Detecting Proximity. The policies a system can enforce are dependent on the
underlying technology. Similarly to ultrasonic beacons, each Client scans for BLE
beacons every 10 seconds. Particularly, we utilize BLE to detect if other users are
within Near reach (c.f. to Section 5.2). That is, the proximity zone (Figure 5.1)
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encompasses the area within 3 meters around a Client. We selected Near for the
maximum range as we believe that if, for example, any employee with an inferior
role to that of the Supervisor is within 3 meters of Alice, then it is a clear indication that the employee is able to visually observe content on Alice’s device he/she
is unauthorized to view. We emphasize that this hard-coded metric of proximity is
implementation specifc as we rely on BLE’s four-step ranging measurements. We
assume that the device admin maintains a database that maps Bluetooth MAC addresses to user IDs, which can be easily retrieved from an enterprise’s preexisting
RBAC system that is incorporated into the EPS. We chose the Client (rather than
the EPS) to track user movements so that Clients can immediately react to proximity
violations and minimize communication with the EPS.

5.4.3

Proximity-Based Device Admin Policies

Much work has been done in the design of policy languages [17, 33, 41, 77]. However, we extend CASSEC’s PrBAC policy specifcation [17] and integrate it into
Android’s existing Device Administration policy specifcation (MercBAC), thereby
enabling MERC to enforce restrictions based on Separation of Duty and Absence
of Other Users. The device admin is solely responsible for enforcing policies on the
persona such as password confguration or device force lock, and similar to Android’s
permission model, the device admin must request the privilege to exercise such capabilities through a security metadata fle stored within the application’s binary. We
do not modify this fle. Instead, the device admin reads a MercBAC policy, written
by the IT admin, which is stored within the application’s data directory. The device
admin must ensure the current context violates the policy’s contextual constraints
prior to exercising force lock (DevicePolicyManager.lockNow()), for example, thereby
applying proximity-based access control to personas. In this way, we increase the
ease-of-adoption and resiliency to change in MERCOS as a subset of these policy
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features are pre-built into the stock Android OS. Figure 5.2 provides an example
MercBAC device admin policy that refects the scenario presented in Section 5.1.

Fig. 5.2. Example proximity-based MercBAC policy.

5.4.4

The EID and LID

We take advantage of preexisting data structures for EIDs. An IT admin is required to perform a registration process with Google which entails claiming and verifying an enterprise domain name (e.g., www.example.com) to use Android For Work
(AFW). In addition, an Eddystone UID Namespace is generated by selecting the frst
10 bytes of a SHA-1 hash of the domain name. The MERC uses the Eddystone UID
as the EID to describe top-level locations.
The intentional naming system proposed by Adjie-Winoto et al. [94] is an attributevalue naming system with nested attribute-value pairs. Such a naming architecture
provides signifcant fexibility in defning location-based information of broad resolutions. As such, we adopt this attribute-value system to construct a LID. The
advantage is that the particular construction of a LID is defned by each enterprise
IT admin instead of uniformly. Here, we use a simple construction of the following
form: [building = B [foor = F [room = R]]].
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5.5

Prototype Implementation

5.5.1

Client

We made minor modifcations to the Android OS to support MERCOS. We frst
created and exposed a new system API called switchPersona(string eid). This API
switches the persona, and is called whenever a new EID is detected from an ultrasonic beacon. For simplicity, we allow device admins to register an EID within
Android’s "settings.db", which is a database managed by the Settings application,
via the Settings.Global interface. In this way, the database can be globally accessed
no matter which persona is currently active. Normally, third-party applications can
only read from Settings.Global, and not write. To ensure that the device admins
are the only entities with the write privilege, we call Android’s DevicePolicyManager.getActiveAdmins() function. It returns a package name list of all device admin
applications, but only one should exist as the enterprise controls the list of applications that exist within the work persona. Prior to updating the EID database, we
verify that the package name of the entity attempting to update the EIDs is authorized to do so. Read access to EIDs is not a privacy concern since they are constructed
based on enterprises’ public web domain [31].
To send/receive ultrasonic beacons, we integrate a third-party sound-based, data
communication SDK [92] into our custom device admin which operates at frequencies
above 18 KHz (i.e., frequency range inaudible to the human ear). The reader may
wonder why we integrate such a feature at the application level rather than the system
level. We believe that this is suÿcient as modern smartphones already silently process
audio in the background via application-level programs. For example, the Google
Now application allows the Android OS to respond to voice-commands [95]. So in
reality, the ability to read ultrasonic beacons would be integrated into the Google
Now application so that it can be a system-wide functionality. The device admin also
periodically scans for BLE beacons every 10 seconds using the android.bluetooth.le
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APIs [31]. Nearby users are identifed by maintaining a SQL database which contains
a mapping from BLE MAC addresses to user IDs.

5.5.2

EPS

The EPS was implemented in PHP and hosted on a remote commercial server. It
disseminates policy fles to Clients. The EPS provides a function that can be remotely
invoked via URL: getPolicy(NetMsg) (Figure 5.1). The function is invoked by Clients
whenever a new policy number is detected in ultrasonic beacons.

5.6

Experimental Results

5.6.1

Deployment

In this section, we report experimental results. First, we deployed our MERC
prototype in one of our campus buildings. Figure 5.3 displays the schematics of our
tested area. The green (benign) and red (malicious) circles and arrows indicate the
placements and facing directions of PMs, respectively. A large, grid-patterned rectangle points out a sub-area of an enterprise environment that contains only one PM.
The gray-flled circles indicate the current positions of Clients. The gray, circular
outlines indicate the possible positions of Clients during testing. Second, our modifcations to the Android source code were tested on the Android Pixel C tablet device
running Android Nougat (API 22 v7.0). Last, each PM was a Dell A215 Multimedia
Speaker, and each speaker was connected to a device capable of playing MP3s. All
experiments were conducted in areas in which the ambient noise were minimal.

5.6.2

Experiments

Experiment 1: Enterprise Setting Suitability. An enterprise may place
PMs in arbitrary locations such as an oÿce or a large sitting area (e.g., auditorium).
Therefore, it is necessary to understand how messages embedded in ultrasounds will
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Fig. 5.3. Testing area which contains our positioning module (PM#)
and Clients (C#). Arrows indicate the directions PMs are facing.

propagate. Specifcally, the goal of the experiment is to determine if the Client is able
to capture location information at varying distances away from a PM. The Client (C1 )
was placed at six di˙erent positions away from the PM (PM1 ), and at each position,
PM1 transmitted 10 ultrasonic beacons at its maximum possible amplitude.
Figure 5.4 shows results of this experiment. C1 was able to detect beacons with
strong accuracy, at least 90%, up to 30m away from PM1. However, at a distance of
36m, C1 was only able to detect beacons with 60% accuracy. The lower detection
rate at 36m was expected as it is a natural phenomena that everyone observes on
a daily basis. That is, there is a direct correlation between the distance between a
source of sound and a listener and the likelihood of the sound being heard. Therefore,
a speaker that can emit sounds at larger volumes would be able to transmit beacons
to Clients at farther distances. Nevertheless, this experiment has demonstrated that
ultrasonic beacons can be detected with 100% accuracy in most enterprise settings
since such settings (i.e., oÿces and meetings rooms) are signifcantly smaller than
24m on the longest sides [89].
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Fig. 5.4. Capturing location information at varying distances.

Experiment 2a and 2b: Collisions. Sound waves can transmit arbitrarily far,
and sounds from varying sources can mesh together. If multiple PMs are placed in
relatively close proximity, the ultrasounds may also blend together. We must determine if placing PMs in isolated areas that are in proximity, but demarcated by walls
or closed doors will cause any interference with Clients. We explain in the security
analysis below that an adversary is unable to transmit valid ultrasonic beacons. However, we temporarily relax our video monitoring assumption (Section 5.1), thereby
enabling an attacker to transmit beacons on the same ultrasonic frequency to cause
collisions via malicious PMs (red PMs in Figure 5.3) from adjacent rooms/areas. We
perform two experiments to determine the extent in which an adversary can perform
a Denial-of-Service attack with the constraint that the adversary is using the same
hardware deployment acquired by hijacking legitimate PMs. In Experiment 2a, C2
and PM2 are placed within a closed-door room situated roughly 3 and 6 meters away
from PM3, respectively. PM3 is pressed against and facing a 1 ft (˘0.3 m) thick
wall. In Experiment 2b, C2 and PM2 remain in the same positions, but PM3 is now
pressed against and facing the room’s door. A notable di˙erence between the two
experiments is that, although still demarcated by some obstruction, PM3 may have
a likelier chance to permeate through the room as cracks exist around the door that
sound can travel through.
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Table 5.1.
Location detection rates
Experiment

PM2

PM3

2a

100%

0%

2b

100%

6%

2b0

77%

57%

In each experiment (Table 5.1), each PM begins transmission, at maximum volume, of 30 ultrasonic beacons at a specifed time using a time-based activation program. In Experiment 2a, C2 did not detect beacon collisions as it identifed 100%
of PM2 ’s beacons and 0% of PM3 ’s beacons. Such results demonstrate that sound
is indeed inherently localized as the attacker could not successfully penetrate the obstructing wall(s). In Experiment 2b, C2 detected beacon collisions as it identifed
100% and 6% of PM2 ’s and PM3 ’s beacons, respectively. We performed Experiment 2b once more (i.e., 2b0 ), but we instead increase the adversary’s attack power
by leaving PM3 at full volume while reducing PM2 ’s volume by half. As a result,
C2 identifed 77% and 57% of PM2 ’s and PM3 ’s beacons, respectively. Such results
demonstrate that under a certain adversarial model, an attacker can cause collisions.
Given the unprecedentedly fne-grained nature of EED scenarios that we envision for
MERC (e.g., di˙erent LID per room), processing beacons from adjacent rooms/areas
would cause the Client to continuously switch containers or apply the wrong policies.
Such erratic behavior is a major issue w.r.t. security, and it would also potentially
ruin the user experience. To address this issue, we implemented a temporal localization analysis mechanism to determine the correct candidate to enforce in a set of
beacons recently heard by a Client. We frst determine which beacon is consumed
more frequently, but using only this criteria is insuÿcient as an attacker could simply
increase the rate of transmission of malicious beacons. Therefore, beacons must also
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Table 5.2.
Proximity detection rates of two stationary BLE devices
Distance

Rm1

Rm2

Rm3

2m

FNR: 0%

FNR: 0%

FNR: 4%

4m

FPR: 2%

FPR: 0%

FPR: 0%

be consumed at a valid transmission rate, otherwise the attack is detectable. We
discuss this further in Section 5.7.
Experiment 3: Proximity Detection. We test the proximity detection method
which relies on BLE beacons. The device admin is confgured to enforce the MercBAC policy in Figure 5.2. In particular, we test if Alice’s Client can accurately
determine the distance to the unauthorized user. Two BLE-enabled devices were
used to conduct the experiment: a Nexus 6P smartphone (C1 ) and a Pixel C tablet
(C2 ) acting as Alice’s and the unauthorized user’s Clients, respectively. We repeated
this experiment twice; di˙erentiating the two by placement of the stationary Clients:
a distance of 2m (< Near) and 4m (>= Near) between each other which indicates
attack and non-attack instances, respectively. We use the following metric to evaluate
the e˙ectiveness of the proximity detection. False negative rate (FNR) is defned as
the percentage of attack instances in which C1 mistakenly evaluates as non-attack
instances. False positive rate (FPR) is defned as the percentage of non-attack instances in which C1 mistakenly evaluates C2 as attack instances. We performed
the experiment three times, each on the 1st, 2nd, and third (Figure 5.3) foor of an
isolated room. C2 emitted 100 BLE beacons with each fve seconds apart.
Table 5.2 presents the false positive rates and false negative rates of proximity
detection under varying distances. C1 precisely evaluated C2 as Near when C2
was placed 2m away, with a 4% FNR in the worst case. When Clients were situated 4m apart, a FPR of 2% was observed in the worst case. Such occurrences
can be attributed to possible interferences caused by the environment since BLE is
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a radio-based technology, and such technology is susceptible to signal attenuation.
The experiment has demonstrated that if unauthorized employees enter Alice’s vicinity, with high accuracy, the device admin would be able to force lock the persona.
However, an enterprise may consider a 4% FNR non-negligible as personas would be
inaccessible in such instances. We leave the investigation of alternative proximity
technologies for future work.
Experiment 4: Battery Consumption. Mobile devices are resource constrained, and continually probing sensors can tax the device. The Clients are continually listening for ultrasonic and BLE beacons. The goal of this experiment is to
observe the consumption of the device’s battery. We monitored the device’s battery
percentage when running both the unmodifed OS and our customized system, separately. We performed this experiment three times on each system. Towards this goal,
we set WindowManager class’s FLAG_KEEP_SCREEN_ON which is an Android
mechanism to force the screen to never turn o˙. It is vital that this fag is set as it
ensures that the listening service is not temporarily halted or shutdown by the stock
Android resource management system. We logged the battery consumption every
hour.
Figure 5.5 shows results of this experiment. As observed from the graph, the
average performance impact of MERCOS is minimal as compared to the non-modifed
OS. The maximum di˙erence observed each hour was 2%. An explanation for this
result is that Android already silently processes audio in the background when the
unmodifed OS is used (e.g., Google Now application’s voice-activation services). The
processing of ultrasonic beacon in MERCOS takes precedent over the voice-activation
services. Thus, the only additional processing that is performed in our custom OS
is the scanning of BLE beacons. Therefore, integrating features of our CAS into
resource-constrained devices is practical.
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Fig. 5.5. Average battery consumption of a Client.

5.7

Security Analysis
We discuss possible attacks to our system, and means to to prevent or mitigate

them.

5.7.1

Attacking Ultrasonic Beacons

Replay Attack. An attacker may attempt a simple replay attack. The goal of
the attack is to confuse the MERC system to activate an incorrect persona and policy
on a Client. The attack is executed by recording a previously transmitted ultrasonic
message and re-transmitting it at a di˙erent time or location. We protect the system
from replay attacks by embedding temporal information within the beacon. The
components in the system must have loosely synchronized clocks. We extract the
timestamps and compare them to the current time, and then determine if the time
di˙erence exceeds a specifed threshold. In the midst of Experiment 1, at a distance of
24m, prior to signal degradation at 30m, we averaged the elapsed time in milliseconds
to transmit, receive, and process 30 ultrasonic beacons. The longest sides of most
oÿces or meeting rooms are signifcantly smaller than 24m, which we believe refects
the maximum distance an ultrasonic beacon must travel. On average, the complete
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process took approximately 1.33 seconds. Although the longest elapsed time recorded
was 2.5 seconds, all other recorded times fell well below two seconds. As a result,
we set our threshold to two seconds. Therefore, the system would be able to detect
malicious activity under the threat of a simple attacker.
In this chapter, we do not consider a sophisticated attacker that is able to execute a wormhole attack [96]. A wormhole attack is similar to a replay attack except
that the adversary tunnels the beacon through a "wormhole". Defending against
such an attack is quite challenging as the wormhole allows the re-transmission at a
di˙erent location with minimal delay, possibly within milliseconds. A sophisticated
method to address both attacks would be to employ ultrasonic distance-bounding
techniques [26, 97]. Such techniques were not investigated for several reasons. First,
recently proposed techniques require special hardware, and modern smartphones are
not currently capable of handling such a task. Second, given the scenarios that we
envision for MERC, such a feature would incur signifcant overhead for each architectural component. For these reasons, MERC would not satisfy the main goals of the
paper as ease of integration and interoperability would be signifcantly reduced.
Denial-of-Service. In Experiment 2, we addressed the issue of collisions as result of benign position modules in adjacent rooms. However, an attacker can execute
a denial-of-service (DOS) attack by physically tampering with or altering the beacons that are transmitted from PMs. For example, an attacker may tamper with
a benign PM to transmit audio shifted to a frequency that will negate legitimate
ultrasonic beacons. If this occurs, the Clients may consume data that is corrupted
and indecipherable; persona activation and policy deployment will not function properly. It is diÿcult to defend against such a DOS attack, but it can be detected. The
results in Experiment 1 and 2 demonstrate high accuracy with respect to detecting
beacons. Consequently, repetitious consumption of indecipherable beacons can be inferred as malicious activity, especially if enterprises appropriately place benign PMs
as to minimize collisions between those devices. Another practical method that can
be immediately employed is Android’s Geofences APIs [31]. A geofence is a circular
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area defned by a latitude, longitude, and radius, which can be specifed by the device
admin. The device admin thus becomes more context aware as it is alerted whenever a user enters/exits the geofence. Experiencing GPS signal attenuation is not a
cause for concern since the device admin would instead place a geofence to entirely
encompass, for example, NekSec’s campus. An expected EID is thus established once
a Alice enters the campus, otherwise, a DOS attack can be inferred. Last, physical
security could also be utilized by delegating the responsibility of monitoring for malicious location devices to sentries placed throughout the campus. Nevertheless, the
security of personas would still be ensured if enterprises apply defense-in-depth as
described in Section 5.4.2.

5.7.2

Attacking BLE Beacons

Rooting. A possible attack to our system involves a user rooting his/her Client,
and maliciously modifying the Bluetooth MAC address. In this way, the Client can
impersonate another user of the system. To mitigate such an attack, an enterprise
must employ hardware and software mechanisms (e.g., Android’s dm-verity) that
enhance device security. For example, Samsung KNOX 2.0 is a custom Android
OS which has a low-level security feature that leaves the device inoperable once it
detects a root attack [20], which is a suÿcient mechanism to defend against malicious
modifcation of the MAC address (or any root-based attack targeting MERC).
Masking BLE. The simplest attack malicious users could execute is to mask
their MAC address by either disabling the Bluetooth peripheral on the Client or simply leaving it in another room. By doing so Clients will be unable to correctly enforce
proximity constraints. There are several measures that can be taken against such
attack. First, an enterprise simply has to enforce mandatory enabling of Bluetooth
through the device admin application, which completely controls the settings and confgurations of the Clients. Second, accidental or malicious misplacing of the Client
can be addressed by supplementing the system with a facility to detect the number
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of individuals in a room. For example, the system by Oluwatimi et al. [17] takes
an infrastructure-based approach (i.e., independent of the Clients) utilizing signal
attenuation of WiFi radios caused by human interference to achieve occupant localization. Therefore, if the number of individuals in a room and the number of MAC
addresses do not match, the system will infer malicious behavior, and subsequently
revoke access to resources.
Unauthorized Device User. Another attack vector involves an unauthorized
individual obtaining an authorized user’s phone, whether by theft or voluntary provision. Such an attack would allow an individual to gain unauthorized access to
persona content. To mitigate such a threat, biometric techniques can be employed.
For example, Draÿn et al. [98] demonstrate that it is possible to passively detect
that a mobile device is being used by a non-authorized user by modeling user keyboard interactions. Wang et al. [99] explore biometric signatures using WiFi-based
techniques to determine the identity of an individual. Using such techniques, it is
therefore possible to associate an individual with a device.

5.8

Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the feasibility of introducing context-based con-

straints to containers under a multi-enterprise context. Contextual information is
supplied by our prototype PBS that relies on ultrasonic2 and Bluetooth Low Energy
beacons to address occupancy detection. With such information, proximity-based
constraints can be e˙ectively and eÿciently enforced on Android’s personas, which,
to the best of our knowledge, has never been investigated. We also demonstrate how
to allow multiple context-aware systems from di˙erent enterprises to serve a feet of
devices while maintaining privacy, security, scalability, and interoperability. Serving
devices in such a manner is accomplished via our secure ultrasonic beacon protocol.

2

Careful construction and transmission of ultrasonic signals must be taken to prevent adverse e˙ects
on the human body [100].
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6. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we investigated various aspects of context-aware systems that is
applicable to mobile systems technology within enterprise environments. We specifically asked how do we capture contextual information, incorporate contextual constraints into access control policies, and enforce contextual access control policies?
To those ends, we frst proposed a modifed version of the Android operating system
called CBAC (Chapter 3) that enables end-users to confgure context-based policies
for mobile applications. The context-based policies were used in the decision process
by our custom OS to determine whether a mobile application, possibly malicious, has
access to content (i.e., data and resources) that exists on the device depending on the
context in which the content was requested. In this system, contextual constraints
consisted of spatio-temporal parameters (i.e., location and time) which included the
user being able to specify logical locations. Location-based information was captured
via the end-user’s device using the WiFi peripheral. We specifcally triangulated the
user’s position by analyzing the surrounding WiFi access points and their RSSI levels.
While the security of enterprise content may depend on the presence of others,
we also proposed a proximity-based mobile architecture. The proposed architecture
CASSEC 2.0 (Chapter 4) supports context-based access control decisions based on
the location of the user requesting access and the proximity of other users in a monitored area, so that the appropriate privileges to access remote enterprise content
is automatically granted. In addition, we extend the PrBAC model to incorporate
confdence constructs that would allow the system’s access control decisions to be infuenced by the degree of reliability of extracted contextual information. We evaluate
our confdence constructs by implementing two new authentication mechanisms. Coproximity authentication employs our time-based challenge-response protocol, which
leverages Bluetooth Low Energy beacons as its underlying occupancy detection tech-
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nology. Biometric authentication relies on the accelerometer and fngerprint sensors
to measure behavioral and physiological user features to prevent unauthorized users
from using an authorized user’s device.

Fig. 6.1. High-level characteristics of each context-aware system.

We also proposed the MERC (Chapter 5) system which addresses the issue of
applying proximity-based constraints to the management of end-user devices via mobile containerization techniques and technologies when end-users may be employed
by or consult for multiple enterprises. As enterprise content may be downloaded
to end-users’ devices, MERC, our custom Android OS, ensures that the content is
isolated from non-enterprise related content via platform-level containerization (i.e.,
personas). MERC then applies location-based and proximity-based constraints to the
secure containers and their content. Contextual information is captured via a device’s
microphone and Bluetooth peripheral. Our novel approach uses ultrasonic sound that
is inaudible to the human ear to determine a user’s location. We then use Bluetooth
Low Energy technology to determine proximity of other users. We demonstrate how
to integrate context-based constraints into Android Device Administration policies
in order for an enterprise to restrict employees’ access to containers’ content based
on the proximity of other employees. Distinguishing characteristics of each of the
previously mentioned systems are highlighted in Figure 6.1.
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In the future, we will investigate how to enhance system security by incorporating
more contextual information. Experiment 2 in Section 5.6 demonstrates that adjusting the amplitude of ultrasonic beacons a˙ects the transmission distance. We can
potentially exploit phenomenon such as this to support micro-position access control
policies. For example, in a large sitting area containing tens of employees, a single
high-level employee may instead use his smartphone device as a positioning module to support micro-position transmission of ultrasonic beacons. In this way, the
high-level employee may adjust the device’s volume to minimal levels to impose temporary restrictions on only low-level employees’ devices that are within a few feet.
One limitation of the proposed proximity-based systems presented in this work is
the inability to deduce potential shoulder-surfng attacks. Shoulder-surfng attacks
exemplify proximity-based situations in which an authorized user accessing sensitive
content via his mobile device is unaware of an unauthorized user in the immediate
vicinity, thereby leaving the authorized user’s sensitive content vulnerable to potential information leakage. The most interesting aspect of this constructed scenario is
that current proximity-based access control systems, including ones presented in this
dissertation, would apply access control constraints regardless of whether the attack
is possible. The unauthorized user may be situated in front of the authorized user,
outside of the device’s front screen peripheral. We intend to also develop the expressiveness of proximity-based access control policies and rely on micro-positioning
technologies to resolve such contentious access control decisions.
Amongst the proposed systems, techniques, technologies, and context-based policies, which is the best strategy to employ? There is no one-size-ft-all approach; a
specifc solution may be only applicable to a specifc problem or scenario. An enterprise that desires to integrate a context-aware access control system into its mobile
IT infrastructure must frst answer several questions, which include which content
must be protected, who or what must the content be protected from (e.g., constructing the adversarial model), and what it means for the content to be secured (e.g.,
sustaining desirable properties under intelligent adversaries)? Once such questions
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are answered, the enterprise must determine the set of contextual information within
the physical or computing realm that can be leveraged to provide more dynamic
and robust access control mechanisms, while minimizing the cost of deploying the
technologies required to implement such security facilities. This dissertation examines various security requirements and real-world context-based problem scenarios
and subsequently proposes several example context-aware access control solutions to
address those scenarios.
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